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Antitrust Implications
of Agricultural Cooperatives
INTRODUCTION
The cooperative' has experienced a long history in the United
States2 and Great Britain.3 In the United States, its origin can
'A[n agricultural] cooperative ... is basically an association organized
* . . for the purpose of marketing products produced... [by] its members,
or purchasing supplies used by its members .... Characteristically, they
are non-profit. Their objectives are to help their members obtain the best
price for their products or effect important savings in the purchase of...
supplies.
Recent Developments, The Agricultural Cooperative Antitrust Exemption-Fairdale Farms,
Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 67 CORNELL L. REV. 396, 396 n.3 (1981-82) (quoting Noakes,
Exemption for Cooperatives, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 407, 409 (1961)).
2 See Mischler, Agricultural Cooperative Law, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 381, 381-
82 (1957-58). In 1752, Benjamin Franklin organized a mutual fire insurance company.
Conflecticut dairy farmers organized a cooperative marketing association in 1804. The
Mormons had cooperative irrigation societies, cooperative stores, and other forms of
cooperation. J. VOORIS, COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE: PEOPLE'S CHANCE IN A WORLD OF
BIGNESS 83, 194 (1975).
1 The Rochdale pioneers, who contributed the principles of cooperatives, "estab-
lished the first permanent cooperative in England in 1844." M. ABRAHAMSEN, COOPER-
ATIVE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 47 (1976). In 1860, the Rochdale Society instituted what are
commonly referred to as the Rochdale principles:
I. Members should provide their own-capital that earned a fixed return.
2. Only the best goods should be supplied to members.
3. Full weight and measure should be given.
4. Market price should be charged.
5. No credit should be given.
6. Profits should be divided pro rata by the amount of each member's
purchases.
7. Each member should have only one vote.
8. Members may be male or female.
9. Periodically elected officers and committees should manage the coop-
erative.
10. A percentage of the profits should be allotted to education.
I1. Members should receive frequent statements and balance sheets.
See id. at 48. The Society developed these principles over a 16-year period on a trial-
and-error basis while operating a small consumer cooperative. This explains the disa-
greement among scholars concerning the principles' wording, number, and time of
development. Id. Though the Rochdale principles have evolved, some of the basic ideas
remain. See id. at 50; Mischler, supra note 2, at 382 n.5. For a discussion of the origin
of the Rochdale principles and their application today see M. ABRARAmASEN, supra, at
48-50.
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be traced to the National Grange movement. 4 Even before the
Grange movement, cooperation among farmers had been a not-
able characteristic of farm life.- Following the Grange move-
ment, use of the agricultural cooperative as a form of business
association grew.6 To protect agricultural cooperatives from fed-
eral antitrust laws, in 1914 Congress exempted noncapital stock
farmer cooperatives from the scope of these laws7 by enacting
4 From 1871 to 1876, more than 20,000 local Granges were established. The
Grange was an early form of farm cooperative that operated on an informal basis to
buy and sell for its members. In 1874, the National Grange adopted the Rochdale
principles and, although the movement ultimately declined, it demonstrated that these
principles "offered the most promising basis for sound cooperative efforts." Mischler,
supra note 2, at 381-82. See also Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 278 U.S. 515,
538 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Note, Trust Busting Down on the Farm: Narrowing
the Scope of Antitrust Exemptions for Agricultural Cooperatives, 61 VA. L. REV. 341,
341 (1975).
1 The beginning of agriculture would have been impossible without cooperation
among farmers. No individual farmer could defend the crops against nomadic tribes,
but when all farmers in a region joined together, they could successfully farm. In the
United States, the pioneers helped their neighbors build homes and farm buildings. They
also joined together to defend against attack and to care for the ill. See J. VooRHIs,
supra note 2, at 194. But see Mischler, supra note 2, at 381, where it is stated that
before 1870, farms were generally isolated and dispersed economic units; farmers put
produce on the market in competition with each other; they had inadequate storage,
financing and knowledge of market conditions; and their purchasers were much more
concentrated.
Massachusetts enacted the first farmer cooperative statute in 1866. By 1928, only
two states did not provide for incorporation of agricultural cooperatives. See Frost v.
Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 278 U.S. at 539-40 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6 During this century, farmers have increasingly used the cooperative form of
business association because of a belief that it is well suited to the economic and social
needs of the family farm. See Mischler, supra note 2, at 381. In the late 1800s, as
commodities became easier to transport and farmers became more aware of the com-
petitive market, farmers began to organize cooperatives. Noakes, Agricultural Cooper-
atives, 33 A.B.A. ANTrRUSr L.J. 7, 7-8 (1967). Some early cooperatives began with the
goal of handling the entire output of specific crops in a region so that the farmer might
receive a higher price; however, these cooperative efforts were limited by the fact that
they could not control supply, See Mischler, supra note 2, at 382.
After the Grange movement, state and federal antitrust laws delayed cooperative
growth. See Note, supra note 4, at 341 & n.3. By the 1920s, however, there were
approximately 12,000 marketing associations and 2,000 farm supply associations. See
Mischler, supra note 2, at 382. For general discussions of the effect of state antitrust
law on cooperative growth and the subsequent state antitrust exemptions for coopera-
tives, see FARMERS COOPERATrVE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, LEGAL PHASES
OF FARMER COOPEAaTIVES 265-75 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL PHASES]. See also
Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 398 n.11.
"Based upon common law abhorrence of business restraints, such laws have no
inherent exceptions. If an activity is to be conducted outside the scope of the antitrust
laws, it must be done on the basis of a specific exemption. Antitrust immunity is not
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section 6 of the Clayton Act. 8 Eight years later, with the enact-
ment of the Capper-Volstead Act, Congress extended this im-
munity to capital stock cooperatives engaged in collective
marketing, handling and processing. 9
lightly implied." Comment, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Antitrust Laws, 43 NEB.
L. REv. 73, 73 (1963-64). See generally Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 396 n.2
(providing a brief discussion of the nature and rationale for various antitrust exemptions).
I Section six of the Clayton Act provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organiza-
tions, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.
Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730,
731 (1914)). See generally Saunders, The Status of Agricultural Cooperatives Under the
Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. B.J. 35, 43 n.33 (1960) (discussing the rationale for the Clayton
Act § 6 distinction between labor unions and agricultural cooperatives).
The first two sections of the Capper-Volstead Act provide:
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers,
planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in
associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in
collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in
interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged.
Such associations may have marketing agencies in common; and such
associations and their members may make the necessary contracts and
agreements to effect such purposes: Provided, however, That such associ-
ations are operated for the mutual benefit of the members thereof, as such
producers, and conform to one or both of the following requirements:
First. That no member of the association is allowed more than
one vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may
own therein, or,
Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or
membership capital in excess of 8 per cenum per annum.
And in any case to the following:
Third. That the association shall not deal in the products of
nonmembers to an amount greater in value than such as are handled
by it for members.
If the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that
any such association monopolizes or restrains trade . .. to such an
extent that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced by
reason thereof, he shall serve ... a complaint ... [and] a notice of
hearing ... requiring the association to show cause why an order should
not be made directing it to cease and desist from monopolization or
restraint of trade .... If upon such hearing the Secretary of Agriculture
shall be of the opinion that such association monopolizes or restrains
trade in interstate or foreign commerce to such an extent that the price
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After the enactment of the Sherman Act,'0 farmers who
organized into a cooperative were technically within the scope
of that Act since joint pricing and marketing of products in-
of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced thereby, he shall issue
and cause to be served upon the association an order reciting the facts
found by him, directing such association to cease and desist from
monopolization or restraint of trade.
Capper-Volstead Act §§ 1-2, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1982) (original version at ch. 57, §§
1-2, 42 Stat. 388, 388 (1922)). If a cooperative doing business in interstate commerce
does not qualify for either Clayton Act or Capper-Volstead Act immunity, the federal
antitrust laws continue to apply. LEGAL PHASES, supra note 6, at 275.
There were several reasons prompting passage of the Capper-Volstead Act as a
supplement to § 6 of the Clayton Act. Stock cooperatives were unsure of the application
of the antitrust laws to them. Non-stock cooperatives believed the statutory immunity
and its judicial interpretation were too narrow. There was also a belief that some limit
should exist on the cooperative's ability to increase food prices. See Lemon, Antitrust
and Agricultural Cooperatives Collective Bargaining in the Sale of Agricultural Products,
44 N.D.L. REv. 505, 506 & nn. 11-12 (1967-68) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust and
Agricultural Cooperatives]; Note, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Search for Parity-
A Confrontation with the Antitrust Laws, 44 N.D.L. REv. 525, 529 (1967-68). Section
6 of the Clayton Act did not recognize a basic distinction between unions and cooper-
atives-the need for equity financing by cooperatives. Congress passed the Capper-
Volstead Act to remedy this oversight and to allow cooperatives to organize as corporate
entities but with qualifications to ensure they would continue to act like cooperatives.
Lemon, The Capper-Volstead Act- Will It Ever Grow Up?, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 443,
444 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as The Capper-Volstead Act]. Section 6 failed to list the
activities that a cooperative could perform legitimately. Recent Developments, supra
note 1, at 400. Additionally, Congress hoped that the Capper-Volstead Act would rescue
farmers from hardship caused by the decreasing price of produce and the increasing cost
of input. See Comment, supra note 7, at 77 n.15, 78 nn.17-18 (concerning the 1920
version of the Capper-Volstead Act). Farmers had experienced competitive pressures and
the resulting adverse economic effects from the loss of European export markets. See
Noakes, supra note 6, at 8.
Before Congress passed the Capper-Volstead Act, there were several attempts to
pass similar legislation. See generally 51 CONG. REC. 9246-47 (1914) (statement of Rep.
McDonald) (history of congressional attempts to legislate labor and agricultural exemp-
tions to the Sherman Act); Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 400 n.25 (discussing
attempts to pass earlier version of the Capper-Volstead Act and areas of disagreement
between the two houses of Congress).
Today, because most cooperatives are organized as corporations, the Capper-
Volstead Act is the more important exemption. See Mahaffie, Cooperative Exemptions
Under the Antitrust Laws: A Prosecutor's View, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 435, 436 (1969-70).
But cf. The Capper-Volstead Act, supra, at 445 ("[T]he more proper view is that the
Clayton Act provides the exemption for cooperatives and the Capper Volstead Act, in
authorizing various business practices, says that it is permissible for exempt cooperatives
to issue stock.").
I- See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) (original version at ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209-10
(1890)). Congress defeated an amendment to the Sherman Act which would have ex-
empted agricultural cooperatives. See note 207 infra and accompanying text.
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volves the elimination of competition." Though the "rule of
reason" may have prevented application of the Sherman Act to
farmer associations, Congress passed section 6 of the Clayton
Act ensuring that agricultural cooperatives would not be consid-
ered a combination in restraint of trade. 12 Two policy consider-
ations induced the enactment of both section 6 of the Clayton
Act and the Capper-Volstead Act: the vicissitudes of agriculture
and the relative weakness of the individual farmer's bargaining
power in the agricultural market. 3 Although their scope has
been litigated vigorously,' 4 these two exemptions have enabled
" See Saunders, supra note 8, at 36. Ironically, farmers were one group which
strongly supported the Sherman Act since they were vulnerable to industry's monopolistic
practices. See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145 (1940). When the Sherman Act was
enacted, Congress was concerned that the Act would prohibit farmer associations.
Congress' fears may have been well-founded since the Supreme Court indicated that
cooperatives fell within the scope of the Sherman Act. "The records of Congress show
that several efforts were made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers ...
from the operation of the Act and that all these efforts failed, so that the Act remained
as we have it before us." Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908) (dictum).
See Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 506.
0 See 61 CONG. REC. 2058 (1922) (statement of Sen. Capper); Saunders, supra
note 8, at 36. The bargaining strength of the big processor or packer as compared with
that of the individual farmer remains a fundamental rationale for antitrust protection
for bargaining associations. See Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9,
at 511. This factor is also responsible for other farmer legislation. See The Cooperative
Marketing Act of 1926, 7 U.S.C. §§ 451-57 (1982) (authorizing the acquisition and
exchange of market information by farmers and their cooperatives); Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1982) (allowing issuance of marketing agreements
and marketing orders by the Secretary of Agriculture without violating the antitrust
laws); The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 671 (1982)
(arbitration meetings and agreements authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and
exempted from the antitrust laws); The Robinson-Patman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 13b
(1982) (permitting cooperatives to return to their members either patron refunds or
dividends without violation of the Act's provisions); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (original
version at ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914)) (amended § 7 of the Clayton Act
so that it shall not apply to "transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given
by ... Secretary of Agriculture under any statutory provision vesting such power in
... [the] Secretary .... ") Although 15 U.S.C. § 18 was argued as a defense to the
acquisition in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960), the Court did not apply it since there was no "statutory provision" which
empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to approve this transaction. See id. at 469-70.
1, See notes 50-87, 109-67, 201-301 infra and accompanying text. Despite the large
volume of litigation, the exemptions' scope remains unclear particularly regarding mon-
opolization claims and attempt to monopolize claims. See Note, Agricultural Coopera-
tives and the Antitrust Lans: Clayton, Capper-Volstead, and Common Sense, 44 VA.
L. REV. 63, 82-84 (1958); Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 397. Most case law
involving cooperatives is recent. In the past, Congress prohibited the Department of
Justice from spending money to prosecute farmer associations. Between 1914 and 1922,
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cooperatives to grow quite large"s and to expand into nonagri-
cultural sectors of the economy.' 6 Currently there are local,
regional and national associations for almost every agricultural
activity, 7 and for some nonagricultural activities such as insur-
ance and utility services.
18
This Note discusses the antitrust implications of agricultural
marketing cooperatives. 9 This Note will examine the statutory
structure of the Capper-Volstead Act and section 6 of the Clay-
ton Act. Additionally, the 1960 United States Supreme Court
decision in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association v.
United States0 will be discussed as well as congressional reaction
only one case construed § 6 of the Clayton Act. See Recent Developments, supra note
1, at 401 & n.30. Likewise, there were no controversies which required interpretation of
the Capper-Volstead Act during its first 16 years. Saunders, supra note 8, at 44-45. An
important cause of increased antitrust litigation is the increase in size and effect of
agricultural cooperatives. Noakes, supra note 6, at 9.
,1 Noakes, supra note 6, at 8-9. However, according to one commentator, one of
the keys to future development of farmers' economic power is "the amount of latitude
permitted in organizing bargaining units." Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra
note 9, at 511. See also The Capper- Volstead Act, supra note 9, at 446 (when compared
to processors and packers, agricultural cooperatives are not as large, pervasive or
powerful as they need to be and, therefore, most producer cooperatives merely take the
best price rather than bargain for it).
In 1975, five out of six farmers were members of at least one farmer association.
Note, supra note 4, at 341. These associations are most prominent in the dairy, grain,
livestock, fruit, vegetable, cotton and poultry sectors of the American economy. See J.
VOORHIS, supra note 2, at 89. In 1979 such cooperatives had an annual sales volume
reaching $25.8 billion-29% of all farm receipts. R. HEFLEBOWER, COOPERATIVES AND
MUTUALS IN THE MARKET SYsTEM 32 (1980).
6 See Note, supra note 4, at 343 (listing the various nonagricultural sectors now
occupied by these associations). See also HEFLEBOWER, supra note 15, at 4, (table 1.1)
(providing a list of sectors where cooperatives are prominent). Marketing cooperatives
have begun to handle all aspects of marketing and processing between the producer and
consumer. Noakes, supra note 6, at 9.
1" Mischler, supra note 2, at 383.
' Id.
,9 Marketing cooperatives can be divided into two distinct types, those that process
commodities and those that bargain for their sale. The first of these, the handling
cooperative, receives raw products from its members and increase the product's value
by washing, boxing, drying or other processing. The Capper-Volstead Act, supra note
9, at 447. This cooperative's major problem is acquiring capital and market strength.
See generally id. at 447-49 (describing these problems and how antitrust laws hinder
solutions). The second, bargaining cooperatives, represent the seller at negotiations with
purchasers. The primary difficulties for bargaining cooperatives are attracting member-
producers and buyer recognition. See generally id. at 449-51 (including proposed congres-
sional solutions for these problems).
2- 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
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to that decision. Despite restrictive language in Milk Producers
Association,2' courts have apparently followed the philosophy
embodied in the congressional reaction. 22 Economists have crit-
icized courts for ignoring the cooperatives' enormous economic
power,2 and in response, some courts apparently have shifted
toward requiring stricter behavioral standards before allowing
antitrust immunity to attach.24 This Note concludes with a plea
for Congress to reexamine the policy rationales behind the co-
operative antitrust immunity, as the judicial branch needs
congressional guidance for deciding the scope of cooperative
antitrust immunities.
I. ExPREss REQUIREMENTS FOR RECEIVING
COOPERATIVE ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
Two aspects of the Capper-Volstead Act 25 have been liti-
gated: the requirements for becoming an eligible Capper-Vol-
stead cooperative and the scope of the immunity granted by the
Act.26 The Capper-Volstead Act has several express requirements
to be met before an agricultural cooperative receives immunity:27
the cooperative's members must produce agricultural products; 28
21 See notes 54-79 infra and accompanying text.
2 See notes 88-105 & 202-268 infra and accompanying text.
23 See notes 189-99 infra and accompanying text.
" See notes 269-98 infra and accompanying text.
7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1982) (original version at ch. 57, §§ 1-2, 42 Stat. 388
(1922)).
26 The scope of the Capper-Volstead immunity is discussed at notes 50-87, 109-67
& 201-301 infra and accompanying text.
See 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982).
The question of what happens when a cooperative technically violates one
of [the organizational tests] cannot be answered today.
In deciding the latest Sunkist case, the Supreme Court indicated that
it would consider whether the violations resulted in an increase in the
market influence of the cooperative. Such is not a very precise test, at
best. Nevertheless, such a broadly-framed requirement seems reasonable
and appropriate.
The Capper-Volstead Act, supra note 9, at 445.
- 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). Generally, to meet this criteria, only producers may own
the cooperative's capital stock. Likewise, a non-stock cooperative may have only pro-
ducer-members. An exception to the general rule is the association whose members are
all Capper-Volstead cooperatives. These federated cooperatives are also entitled to the
Capper-Volstead Act's immunity. In Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, the Supreme
Court, holding that a cooperative could not receive Capper-Volstead immunity, relied
on the fact that 15% of its members were not producers but were private corporations,
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the cooperative must operate for its members' mutual benefit;29
the cooperative's nonmember business cannot be greater than its
member business;30 the cooperative must be structured either so
that each member has only one vote regardless of the amount
of membership capital owned3' or such that the cooperative may
not pay dividends exceeding eight percent per year on stock or
membership capital;32 cooperative membership must be volun-
tary;3" and the cooperative must perform one of the statute's
enumerated acts before receiving the immunity.3 4 Most of these
requirements are inherent in an agricultural cooperative's basic
structure and, therefore, should present little problem for the
eligible cooperative.3 1
partnerships, and individuals who handled the grower's fruit and marketed it through
Sunkist. See 389 U.S. 384, 386-88 (1967).
The Capper-Volstead Act protects nut or fruit growers, farmers, planters, ranch-
men, and dairymen. The fact that the statute does not list every type of producer does
not mean Congress intended to omit them. See Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives,
supra note 9, at 507. People who accept the risks and duties of an owner of growing
crops or livestock are producers; whereas, salaried farm managers and cash-rent lessors
are not producers. See id. at 509. A handler may not change his status (e.g., from
handler to producer) to avoid compliance with an order issued under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act. It appears that the cooperative must be a bona fide coop-
erative, not a result of a sham transaction. Courts, therefore, will look at substance not
form. See Note, supra note 9, at 533 (quoting United States v. Elm Spring Farm, 38 F.
Supp. 508, 511 (D. Mass. 1941)).
29 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). This element requires "distributions on a patronage
basis." Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 510. Inherent in this
element is the concept of absolute farmer control in order for the association's activities
to serve the producer's interest. This element parallels the "legitimate objects" standard
in § 6 of the Clayton Act. See id.
- 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). Nonmember business has been defined as "[all com-
modities not actually produced by members, but which are marketed by an association."
Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 510. This requires precise
bookkeeping. This requirement is difficult for a bargaining cooperative since it must
prove the amount of products "handled" for members and nonmembers. Id.
11 See 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). Regardless of whether this requirement is met, only
producers may vote. See Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 510.
32 See 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). This may be the better organizational format when
large and small farms are cooperative members. See Antitrust and Agricultural Coop-
eratives, supra note 9, at 510. This requirement limits only the return to capital. Although
that rate of return may have enabled cooperatives to attract capital during the 1920s, it
is questionable whether the rate is sufficient today. But see id. at 510-11.
" See 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). See also Mahaffie, supra note 9, at 437.
14 See Mahaffie, supra note 9, at 437. A farm supply cooperative does not qualify
for the Capper-Volstead immunity; however, § 6 of the Clayton Act may provide that
benefit if the cooperative is organized without capital stock. See id.; The Capper- Volstead
Act, supra note 9, at 446.
" Compare note 3 supra with notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
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Since the Capper-Volstead Act does not require the cooper-
ative to have a corporate form or capital stock,36 a bargaining
group may structure itself as an unincorporated association, a
stock or nonstock farmer cooperative, a nonprofit corporation
or a regular business corporation.3 7 If more than one cooperative
forms a federation which then becomes a centralized marketing
agency, this structure should not automatically preclude Capper-
Volstead immunity. 8 Section 6 of the Clayton Act has the added
requirement that the cooperative must operate on a nonprofit
basis.3 9
Additional analysis of the technical requirements of a Cap-
per-Volstead cooperative is beyond the scope of this Note. The
more interesting issues concern the scope of the immunity granted
by the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
A. Early Decisions
On its face, the Capper-Volstead Act appears specific; never-
theless, the parameters of this antitrust immunity are unclear.
40
See 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982).
Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 511.
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29
(1962). See also Mischler, supra note 2, at 394 & n.36. It is possible, however, for
federated cooperatives to lose this exemption. See Comment, supra note 7, at 95
(suggesting that the Sunkist Growers, Inc. opinion requires that the other cooperatives
be in the same or similar lines of production and that the cooperative's mode of operation
may be more important, e.g., the use of separate corporations could, under certain
circumstances, be seen as the economic equivalent of three independent organizations).
" This requirement was intended to encourage patronage distribution rather than
high returns to capital or an equal share distribution. It does not, however, preclude a
profit motive by the cooperative. Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9,
at 510. For a cooperative to receive Clayton immunity, "the organization must be an
agricultural or horticultural organization, instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and
not having capital stock or be conducted for profit." Hufstedler, A Prediction: The
Exemption Favoring Agricultural Cooperatives Will Be Reaffirmed, 22 ADmiN. L. REv.
455, 456 (1969-70).
One difficulty with interpreting the cooperative exemptions is that Congress "did
not [use] ... the indisputable exempting language ... in other statutes conferring
antitrust immunity." Saunders, supra note 8, at 37. A misleading Attorney General
opinion further confused matters: "[The object of the Capper-Volstead Act] was pri-
marily to insure cooperative associations that qualified thereunder immunity from pros-
ecution under the Federal antitrust laws." 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 326, 333 (1930). Since this
statement, however, the Department of Justice has emphasized that the Act "confers
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The Act authorizes farmers collectively to process, prepare for
market, handle and market their products in interstate and for-
eign commerce. 4' The cooperative may also have common mar-
keting agents. 42 The Act also allows cooperatives and their
members to make the necessary agreements to achieve these
purposes.43 The agricultural cooperative exemption allows "pro-
ducers of food products to join together in cooperative associ-
ations for the marketing of their products [and] ... to act
collectively in the sale of their products."" Whereas, section 6
of the Clayton Act establishes a more general immunity.
45
Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act also authorizes the
Secretary of Agriculture to issue cease and desist orders if there
is reason to believe that collective activity is unduly enhancing
the product's price. 46 The court in United States v. Borden Co.
47
stated that section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act is a complement
no blanket immunity upon cooperatives." Saunders, supra note 8, at 45.
Because of the Act's vagueness, several courts misconstrued the limits of its
immunity. One such court stated:
It may be that the acts of the defendant cooperative in this case, tested
without regard to the provisions of the Clayton Act, are monopolistic in
character. I have not given serious thought to that question, for it seems
to me when Congress said cooperatives were not to be punished, even
though they became monopolistic, it would be as ill-considered for me to
hold to the contrary as were some of the early labor decisions ....
United States v. Dairy Co-op Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 475, 475 (D. Or. 1943). According to
one commentator, this opinion "is not the law and likely was not the law when it was
written." Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 513. See also Saun-
ders, supra note 8, at 43 n.36. In a more recent example of judicial misconstruction,
one court opined: "[A]n agricultural cooperative is entirely exempt from the provisions
of the antitrust laws, both as to its very existence as well as to all of its activities,
provided it does not enter into conspiracies or combinations with persons who are not
producers of agricultural commodities." United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk
Producers Ass'n, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 1958). This portion of the opinion
was later reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland & Virginia Milk
Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 468 (1960).
1- 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982).
42 Id.
43 Id.
- Noakes, supra note 6, at 7.
Is See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
46 See 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982). Regulations have been promulgated pursuant to this
statute which govern the procedural aspects of the Secretary's order. See 7 C.F.R. §§
1.160-.175 (1985).
41 308 U.S. 188 (1939). The government brought criminal charges for violating §
1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 191.
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to, not a substitute for, Sherman Act enforcement, 48 rendering
section 2 almost useless. In fact, the Secretary of Agriculture
has never relied on it.
49
Cooperatives have attempted to extend the scope of their
antitrust immunities. Borden Co. involved the combination of a
bargaining cooperative with city officials and other non-coop-
erative groups to fix the price of milk. Reading the Act restric-
tively, 0 the Supreme Court said the language of section 6 of the
Clayton Act specifically allows noncapital stock cooperatives to
achieve legitimate objectives .5 However, according to the Court,
a cooperative's Capper-Volstead powers do not "authorize any
combination or conspiracy with other persons in restraint of
1 See id. at 206. The cooperative argued that the Secretary of Agriculture must
take action under § 2 before criminal prosecution could occur. The Court rejected this
argument and said:
But as § I cannot be regarded as authorizing the sort of conspiracies
between producers and others that are charged in this indictment, the
qualifying procedure for which § 2 provides is not to be deemed to be
designed to take the place of, or to postpone or prevent, prosecution under
§ I of the Sherman Act for the purpose of punishing such conspiracies.
Id. The Court stated several reasons to suppport this holding. First, the Capper-Volstead
Act is not so extensive as the Sherman Act, since Capper-Volstead only provides for
administrative relief while the Sherman Act provides for criminal sanctions. The Sherman
Act also prohibits attempts to monopolize. Second, § 2 does not provide relief without
an administrative proceeding. Third, the § 2 procedure applies only where the effect of
the § 1 immunity was to enhance prices unduly. See id. See also Maryland & Virginia
Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. at 463 (reaffirming the Borden Co.
decision upon this issue).
11 Folsom, Antitrust Enforcement Under the Secretaries of Agriculture and Com-
merce, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1623, 1634 (1980); Mahaffie, supra note 9, at 437. But cf.
The Capper-Volstead Act, supra note 9, at 446 (This mechanism has not been used
because there has been no need for its use).
I "That Court's decision, United States v. Borden Co., scotched completely the
claim that Capper-Volstead conferred absolute antitrust immunity." Saunders, supra
note 8, at 45. See also Noakes, supra note 6, at 9-10.
" See 308 U.S. at 204. "ITihe antitrust laws should not be construed to forbid
members of such organizations 'from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof.' "
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982)). See also Comment, supra note 7, at 76-77 & n.14
(legislative history reveals little agreement in Congress about the scope of the "legitimate
objects" language).
The first case to interpret § 6 of the Clayton Act was United States v. King, 250
F. 908 (D. Mass. 1916). In King the court said: "[Section six means] that organizations
such as it describes are not to be dissolved and broken up as illegal, nor held to be
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade; but they are not privileged to adopt
methods of carrying on their business which are not permitted to other lawful associa-
tions." Id. at 910. Accord Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469
(1921) (similarly interpreting § 6 in the context of labor unions).
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trade [and consequently in violation of the Sherman Act] that
these producers may see fit to devise." ' -2 Thus, the general rule
from Borden Co. is that a conspiracy to restrain trade between
a cooperative and non-cooperative entity is not exempt from
antitrust liability by the Capper-Volstead Act.-
3
The Supreme Court continued this restrictive analysis in Milk
Producers Association.5 4 Although the cooperative was an eligi-
ble Capper-Volstead cooperative,5 the Court held that Congress
did not intend to provide Sherman Act section 2 immunity to
cooperatives who engage "in competition-stifling practices." 5 6
-1 308 U.S. at 204-05 (emphasis added). This statement is known as the "other
person" rule. Comment, supra note 7, at 85. Since the Borden Co. decision, cooperatives
may still be able to avoid price fixing charges.
When associations are engaged in price-making activities, it is advisable
for them to meet with prospective purchasers one at a time, refraining
from attempting to negotiate through trade associations, and to form
purchase agreements which go no further than is necessary to market the
products which the association has to offer.
Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 513-14.
" See, e.g., Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 513 (coop-
eratives are not exempt from antitrust laws). The Court extended this principle to prohibit
a combination with cooperatives having non-"farmer" members, as that term "farmer"
was understood in 1922. See National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S.
816, 827-29 (1978). The Borden Co. principle is similar to that which courts apply to
the labor union exemption when the union is involved with a group not concerned with
employer-employee relationships. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 809-10 (1945); Columbia River Packers Ass'n v.
Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145 (1942).
It is arguable that the "other person" rule is not a separate and independent rule
but merely a part of the Milk Producers Ass'n prohibition against predatory practices.
See Saunders, supra note 8, at 48 (arguing that cooperatives are subject to more than
the "other person" rule, this commentator phrased the Borden Co. issue as: "[T]he
issue was not loss, by reason of agreement with outsiders, of an immunity given by
Capper-Volstead, but whether the conduct charged came within the immunity."). But
see Comment, supra note 7, at 91 ("In Maryland and Virginia the Court extended
Borden Co. to include 'legitimate objects' as well as 'other persons.' ").
362 U.S. 458. The cooperative was comprised of about 2,000 dairy farmers and
supplied as much as 86% of the milk purchased by Washington, D.C. area milk dealers.
Id. at 460. For a brief discussion of the legal struggles between the government and this
cooperative, see Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 402 n.41.
" See 362 U.S. at 461. This Court also rejected the argument that the Secretary
of Agriculture had primary jurisdiction under § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act. See id.
at 462-63.
' Id. at 463. The Court said the exemption gave cooperatives the rights and
responsibilities of a corporation. "[T]he general philosophy of [the Clayton and Capper-
Volstead Acts] was simply that individual farmers should be given, through agricultural
cooperatives acting as entities, the same unified competitive advantage-and responsi-
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Thus, according to the Court, agricultural cooperatives may not
engage in "predatory" trade practices.17 Thus, the key question
in later cases is whether the cooperative's acts were predatory.
Unfortunately, courts too often label activity by cooperatives as
"predatory" without further analysis of the concept.5"
The Supreme Court developed this "predatory action" test
by analyzing the legislative history of section 6 of the Clayton
Act and the Capper-Volstead Act.5 9 Congress enacted section 6
to bar federal prosecution of agricultural cooperatives engaged
in interstate commerce 6° and for the purpose of allowing farmers
to form cooperatives without violating the antitrust laws.6 ' Co-
operatives may only fulfill their legitimate objectives without
engaging in predatory trade practices. 62 Under section 1 of the
bility-available to businessmen acting through corporations as entities." Id. at 466.
A Massachusetts district court issued an opinion shortly after the district court
opinion in Milk Producers Ass'n. Criticizing the lower court opinion, the Massachusetts
court could "think of no purpose to be served by permitting cooperatives to use unfair
methods to put competitors out of business." April v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 168
F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Mass. 1958).
1 362 U.S. at 463, 465-66, 467 (Court using this language is analyzing both
statutory immunities). See also LEGAL PSaSs, supra note 6, at 277 ([T]he courts are
primarily concerned with how the defendant employs its power and strength, and the
legality of a large industrial unit depends not on its size but upon the character of the
business methods employed."). The court in April v. National Cranberry Ass'n first
condemned a cooperative's "predatory" practices saying that Capper-Volstead did not
make lawful "purely predatory practices seeking to monopolize [in ways] forbidden to
an individual corporation." 168 F. Supp. at 923. For the definition of "predatory
practices," see notes 109-113 infra and accompanying text.
" Compare Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen County Coop. Bee Growers Ass'n, 725
F.2d 564, 569 (10th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he association may not engage in predatory tactics
such as picketing and harassment, coerced membership and discriminatory pricing.")
with Kinnett Dairies v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 631 n.31 (M.D. Ga. 1981)
(detailed analysis of the meaning of "predatory"), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (1Ith Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1327 (1984).
' See 362 U.S. at 464-67.
Id. at 464. Congress passed the Act due to its concern that "the mere organi-
zation of farmers for mutual help was often considered to be a violation of the antitrust
laws." Id. The existing legislative history, being more concerned with labor union
development, reveals congressional uncertainty concerning the scope of § 6 as it relates
to agricultural cooperatives but apparently there was no intention totally to exempt
cooperatives from the antitrust laws. See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 399-
400 nn.20-22.
6' See 362 U.S. at 465. Congressional committee reports support this interpretation.
Id. at 465 & n.13.
' Id. at 465-66. See also Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. at 469
(holding that § 6 provides no immunity for a labor union which departs from its
legitimate objectives).
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Capper-Volstead Act, two enumerated statutory powers are the
legitimate objects of an agricultural cooperative. 63 These statu-
tory powers provide for the " '[collective] processing, preparing
for market, handling, and marketing' [of] products through
common marketing agencies and the making of 'necessary con-
tracts and agreements to effect such purposes.' "64 Both the
language and the legislative history indicate that the statute only
authorizes the existence of a cooperative business, not an ex-
emption to the antitrust laws.
65
In determining the nature of prohibited predatory conduct,
it is best to start with the Supreme Court's analysis in Milk
Producers Association. The Court determined the trial court
should not have dismissed the monopolization charge since the
cooperative's acts were not "legitimate objects" of a coopera-
tive. 66 While the Court did not apply the Capper-Volstead Act
to decide the issue of section 7 of the Clayton Act,67 the defend-
ant does not appear to have argued for its application.65 The
" See 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982).
362 U.S. at 466 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982)). But see Case-Swayne Co. v.
Sunkist Growers, 389 U.S. 384, 391 (1967) (language to the effect that Congress passed
the Capper-Volstead Act to clarify and extend a cooperative's exemptions). If this latter
language is correct, the Court succeeded in merely confusing this issue. See The Capper-
Volstead Act, supra note 9, at 443.
61 362 U.S. at 466-67 (providing a brief review of the legislative history). The
Court recognized that the legislative history was conflicting. See id. at 467. See also The
Capper-Volstead Act, supra note 9, at 443 ("As is true of any legislative history, you
can find in the Congressional discussions of the Capper-Volstead Act some material
which supports and material which refutes nearly any point you wish to make."); Note,
supra note 9, at 529 (cooperative's status under the antitrust laws is unclear due to the
conflicting history).
The complaint charged that the association had monopolized and attempted to
monopolize the fluid milk trade in Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia.
362 U.S. at 460. The cooperative's questionable practices included attempts to interfere
with shipments of nonmembers' milk, an attempt to induce a Washington dairy to shift
its non-Association producers to the Baltimore market, the boycott of a feed and farm
supply store in order to compel the owner (who also owned a dairy) to buy cooperative
milk, and the compelling of another dairy to purchase cooperative milk by the use of
financial leverage. Id. at 468. These activities, if proven, would constitute violation of
§ 2 of the Sherman Act and would be beyond the "legitimate objects" of a cooperative
and the protection of the Capper-Volstead Act. Id.
11 See id. at 468-70. The complaint charged that the association had combined and
conspired with Embassy Dairy and others to eliminate and foreclose competition. Id. at
468-69.
" See id. at 468-70. The trial judge held that the Capper-Volstead Act did not
exempt cooperatives from the sanctions of § 7 of the Clayton Act. United States v.
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd
on other grounds, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). The trial court did not apply Capper-Volstead
since this charge involved activities with people who were not cooperative members. 362
U.S. at 462.
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cooperative did argue that because the Capper-Volstead Act
permitted the cooperative to make "the necessary contracts and
agreements" to process, handle and market milk for their mem-
bers, 69 the Act protected it from section 3 of the Sherman Act.
70
In rejecting this argument, the Court concluded, based on the
evidence and findings, that the parties entered the purchase
contract because of its usefulness in restraining competitors and
competition in the area.7' The Court then held "that the privilege
the Capper-Volstead Act grants producers to conduct their af-
fairs collectively does not include a privilege to combine with
competitors so as to use a monopoly position as a lever further
to suppress competition by and among independent producers
and processors."
7 2
The Court's holding in Milk Producers Association estab-
lished two criteria that an agricultural cooperative must meet in
order to receive the Capper-Volstead immunity. First, the co-
operative must try to achieve a legitimate objective of being a
- 362 U.S. at 471. The cooperative argued that the competitor's assets were useful
for processing and marketing milk. The Court assumed that a purchase for business use
could be lawful under the Capper-Volstead Act. See id. at 472.
10 Id. at 471-72. The trial court found that the motives for and results of the
cooperative's acquisition of its competitors were to "eliminate the largest purchaser of
non-Association milk in the area; force former Embassy non-Association producers
either to join the Association or to ship to Baltimore ... ; eliminate the Association's
prime competitor from government contract milk bidding; and increase the Association's
control of the Washington market." Id. at 469. See also United States v. Maryland and
Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. at 807-08. The facts that supported the §
3 charge were:
I. The cooperative paid almost double the asset's book value.
2. Embassy was the largest area milk dealer competing with the Associ-
ation's dealers.
3. Embassy's owner agreed not to compete in the Washington area for
ten years.
4. Embassy's owner agreed to try to persuade his independent producers
to join the Association or to sell to distributors who purchased from
the Association.
362 U.S. at 470. See Note, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Antitrust Laws: A New
Departure, 36 IND. L.J. 497, 499-500 (1960-61). The trial court also found that the
acquisition caused a foreclosure of competition and the cooperative intended to restrain
trade. This was an unreasonable restraint of trade which violated the Sherman Act. See
362 U.S. at 471.
"' See 362 U.S. at 472. The mere acquisition was not the predatory act. It was the
manner of acquisition as well as the other cooperative activities which were the predatory
practices. See Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 519.
11 362 U.S. at 472.
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cooperative engaged in an agricultural business activity.73 Sec-
ond, the cooperative must not use predatory trade practices in
achieving its goal. 74 This ends-means analysis creates four types
of fact patterns which emerge in agricultural cooperative anti-
trust allegations .
7
1
The Milk Producers Association decision involved two of
three fact patterns. The violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act fell within the predatory act-legitimate goal category. Despite
the Court's language that the cooperative tried to achieve an
illegitimate goal,76 the Court did not hold that expansion in the
market was an illegitimate goal.7 7 It was the anticompetitive
activities, the predatory conduct, which the Court felt was be-
-yond the scope of the Capper-Volstead immunity. 78 The section
2 violation occurred because of the method the Association used,
not the alleged monopolization.
7 9
The Sherman Act section 3 charge is more complex. This
fact pattern may be interpreted as either a predatory act-legiti-
mate goal situation or a predatory act-illegitimate goal fact
pattern. 80 The Court expressly did not decide whether the goal
was legitimate or illegitimate but assumed that the purchase of
the competitor for business use could be lawful under the Cap-
per-Volstead Act. 8' This acquisition, however, was not for a
legitimate business purpose. 82 The intent of both the Association
and its competitor was to suppress competitors and competi-
tion. 83 Thus, a combination of predatory acts and the intent to
71 Id. at 471.
71 Id. at 472.
71 The four different fact patterns are: 1. predatory conduct-illegitimate end; 2.
predatory conduct-legitimate end; 3. nonpredatory conduct-illegitimate end; 4. non-
predatory conduct-legitimate end. See Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d
1173, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192, 195 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). But see Comment, supra note 7, at 99
(indicating only two possible fact patterns).
76 See 362 U.S. at 468.
77 See id.
79 See id.
79 See id.
10 See id. at 470-71.
See id. at 471-72.
81 See id. at 472.
8 See id. One commentator described this aspect of the case stating: "Under [the
legitimate objects] test the Court minutely examines the intentions as well as the methods
of the cooperative." Comment, supra note 7, at 92.
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suppress competition was sufficient to remove the immunity
from the cooperative 4
Left unresolved by Milk Producers Association was whether
expansion is always a legitimate objective for a cooperative. It
may be assumed that self-generated, natural expansion (i.e., an
increase in membership) is a legitimate objective since the goal
of the statutory immunities was to foster this type of growth. 85
Later courts assumed that expansion by acquisition was a legit-
imate goal of a cooperative,8 6 even though the Supreme Court
did not expressly decide that issue.Y This uncertainty forced
Congress to consider amending the Capper-Volstead Act in 1961.
B. Congressional Reaction
Following the Milk Producers Association decision, the Sen-
ate began considering amendments to the Capper-Volstead Act.88
There were two major amendments proposed. 89 One amendment,
See 362 U.S. at 472.
" See notes 9 & 11 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Fairdale Farms v. Yankee Milk, 635 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
" See notes 76-81 supra and accompanying text.
See S. 1643, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. § 401(b)-(c) (1961). See also 107 CONG. REC.
4097-98, 6032 (1961) (President Kennedy supported these amendments in order to en-
courage farmer cooperatives). But see 107 CONG. REc. 6032, 13,357-58 (1961) (Attorney
General opposed to § 401(c) which would allow mergers and acquisitions).
There are indications from the Senate debates that agricultural cooperatives pro-
posed the amendments. See 107 CONG. REc. 13,347-48 (1961) (statement of Sen. Hol-
land). Cf. 107 CONG. REc. 13,348 (1961) (statement of Sen. Holland) (no public Senate
hearings on this issue). The debates also indicate that opposition to the amendment was
initiated by the "world's largest grain dealer." 107 CONG. REc. 13,361 (1961) (statement
of Sen. Aiken).
S. 1643, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(b) stated: "(b) Two or more cooperative
associations, as defined in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, as amended, may
act jointly in a federation of such cooperative associations, or through agencies in
common, in performing those acts which farmers acting together in one such association
may lawfully perform." 107 CONG. REc. 13,348 (1961). An amendment to strike § 401(b)
from the Agricultural Act of 1961 failed. 107 CONG. REc. 13,364 (1961). An amendment
to modify this section also failed. See 107 CONG. REc. 13,557-58 (1961). S. 1643, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(c) stated:
Any such association or federation of such associations may, in addition
to the rights otherwise conferred by law, acquire directly or indirectly the
whole or any part of the assets, stock or other share capital of any other
such association or any corporation engaged in the same or a related kind
of commerce.
Subject to the terms, limitations, and procedures set forth in section 2
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the cooperative joint action amendment, would have given the
cooperatives preferred status over other businesses, whereas the
original Capper-Volstead Act gave that status only to farmers2 °
The other proposed amendment would have allowed the Secre-
tary of Agriculture to approve mergers and acquisitions by ag-
ricultural cooperatives.9 This amendment was designed to
circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in Milk Producers As-
sociation.92 The amendment would have reversed the Milk Pro-
hereof and in addition thereto, the Secretary may require divestiture of
the assets, stock or other share capital, held in violation of this act, if
any there be, in such manner and within such time as he may prescribe.
107 CONG. REc. 13,563 (1961). The motion to strike § 401(c) passed. See 107 CONG.
REC. 13,564 (1961). Defeated supporters of § 401(c) offered for consideration a version
which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to enforce the antitrust laws against
cooperatives. See 107 CONG. REc. 13,569 (1961). An amended version of this amendment
was defeated. See 107 CONG. REc. 13,584 (1961).
Amendment supporters distinguished the two sections. Generally, § 401(b) allowed
joint action by two or more cooperatives so they could do anything a single cooperative
could legally do. Section 401(c) allowed unification of a cooperative and another business
entity, either cooperative or corporate. See 107 CONG. REC. 13,349 (1961) (statement of
Sen. Holland).
See S. 1643, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(b). Another purpose of § 401(b) was
to clarify language which appeared in Sunkist Growers v. Winckler & Smith Citrus
Prods. Co., 284 F.2d 1, 22 (9th Cir. 1960). That language cast doubt upon the ability
of a federated cooperative to do the same acts as a single cooperative. See S. REP. No.
566, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 78, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2243,
2320; 107 CONG. REc. 13,349-50 (1961) (statement of Sen. Holland).
, See S. 1643, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. § 401(c). See also 107 CONG. REc. 13,281
(letter from Rep. Celler to Rep. Cooley). "Subsection (c) authorizes farmer cooperatives
to acquire, directly or indirectly, the assets, stock or other share capital of, or to merge
with any other cooperative or any corporation which is engaged in the same or related
kind of commerce." 107 CONG. REc. 13,339 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kefauver). These
mergers would have been governed by § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act and not by § 7
of the Clayton Act's prohibition against a merger which tended to create a monopoly
or substantially limit competition. Id.
912 According to supporters, § 401(c) was also to reestablish the original intent of
the Capper-Volstead Act by allowing mergers and acquisitions by cooperatives. The
legality of these combinations was supposedly in doubt following the Milk Producers
Ass'n decision. See 107 CONG. REc. 13,559 (1961) (statement of Sen. Ellender). The
proposal's critics argued that one case did not create a threat to cooperatives. See 107
CONG. REc. 13,282 (letter from Rep. Celler to Rep. Cooley).
Better arguments, however, attacked the supporters' analogy of agricultural co-
operatives to other regulated industries which would have justified the Secretary of
Agriculture's regulation of mergers and acquisitions. First, agriculture is a competitive
industry and not regulated by the government. Second, all firms in a regulated industry
are regulated, whereas, the amendment would only regulate cooperatives. See id.; 107
CONG. REC. 13,564 (1961) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
Proponents further justified the immunity on the basis of comparative economic
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ducers Association decision by placing exclusive regulatory
jurisdiction in the Secretary of Agriculture.93 It is important to
note that the Secretary would not have had jurisdiction in the
Milk Producers Association case since that acquisition did not
enhance prices. 94 These proposed amendments drew criticism as
being too broad, unjustified,95 and against public interest 96 par-
strength between cooperatives and corporations. The proponents argued that since the
Department of Justice permitted large corporations to merge, cooperatives should be
allowed to merge. See, e.g., 107 CONG. REc. 13,560 (1961) (statement of Sen. Long);
107 CONG. REC. 13,561 (1961) (statement of Sen. Aiken); 107 CONG. REC. 13,562 (1961)
(statement of Sen. Proxmire). This analysis avoids the issue of whether two wrongs
make a right. Long's argument merely justifies stricter enforcement of antitrust laws
against corporations. See 107 CONG. REc. 13,562 (statement of Sen. Kefauver) (encour-
aging prosecution of large corporations).
I See S. 1643, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. § 401(c) (1961). The opponent's main argu-
ment against § 401(c) was that it would reverse the Milk Producers Ass'n decision. See
107 CONG. REC. 13,339 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kefauver). The amendment's propo-
nents said that the change would allow monopolization but not the evils from mono-
polization (unduly high prices) since the Secretary of Agriculture would retain the power
to modify price under § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act. See 107 CONG. REC. 13,350
(1961) (statement of Sen. Long).
- So, too, it is no answer to say that milk prices in the area did not climb to a
higher level subsequently to the transaction. Prices are affected and influ-
enced by numerous imponderable factors. It is within the realm of possi-
bility that prices might have fallen were it not for the acquisition of
Embassy by the Association.
United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Prod. Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. at 807.
"' "Section 401(b), while short and deceptively simple, actually would grant sweep-
ing and unjustified antitrust exemptions for two or more agricultural cooperatives to
conspire to fix prices, divide territories, boycott third persons, and otherwise restrain
trade." 107 CONG. REc. 13,281 (1961) (letter from Rep. Celler to Rep. Cooley). See
also 107 CONG. REc. 13,339 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kefauver) (examples of restricting
output, dividing territories and customers, blacklisting and other related activities).
The other proposed amendment (§ 401(c)) was criticized because: 1) it gave the
Secretary of Agriculture no criteria by which to measure the antitrust effect of his
decision; 2) the Secretary of Agriculture is not part of the judiciary; 3) the Secretary of
Agriculture could intervene only where monopoly abuses resulted in unduly enhanced
prices; 4) it would be difficult to unscramble a merger after the time passed when unduly
enhanced prices would appear; 5) a question existed concerning whether the Secretary
of Agriculture could impartially administer the amendment; 6) it would be nearly
impossible to demonstrate undue price enhancement as a direct result of monopolization;
7) only large cooperatives would be exempted since smaller cooperatives were already
free to merge. See 107 CONG. REc. 13,343 (statement of Sen. Kefauver), 13,344 (letter
from Rep. Celler to Rep. Cooley), 13,353-54, 13,558 (1961) (statements of Sen. Kefau-
ver).
The amendment would bar challenges to a merger or acquisition which did not
cause a price increase. This approach ignored a merger that created an unfair or
anticompetitive result, which may harm other cooperatives but not cause a price increase.
See 107 CONG. REc. 13,282 (1961) (letter from Rep. Celler to Rep. Cooley) (providing
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ticularly in the area of antitrust protection from cooperatives.97
More specifically, the merger amendment was proposed to
"[reaffirm] and [clarify] the original intent of the Capper-Vol-
stead Act regarding the exclusive authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture over the right of farmer cooperatives coming within
the scope of that act . . . ."I However, the amendment's op-
ponents argued it went beyond the congressional intent of the
Capper-Volstead Act by extending the exemption to cooperative
and corporate-cooperative mergers. 99 In response, the supporters
said that the amendment authorizes neither "predatory prac-
tices" nor "blacklisting."'00
Later in the debate, the supporters retreated from this posi-
tion, arguing instead that the Capper-Volstead Act authorized
several examples). The proposals would not help small, independent farmers. See 107
CONG. REc. 13,355 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kefauver) (providing the example in the
Milk Producers Ass'n decision where the independent farmers were forced to ship their
milk to Baltimore after the cooperative's acquisition of their processor).
1, See 107 CONG. REc. 13,281 (1961) (letter from Rep. Celler to Rep. Cooley); 107
CONG. REc. 13,339-40 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kefauver). Critics believed that courts
could have interpreted § 401(b) to allow cooperatives to act together in a manner which
would have been illegal if the cooperative acted alone. See 107 COIN. REc. 13,350 (1961)
(statement of Sen. Miller). See also 107 CONG. REc. 13,281 (1961) (letter from Rep.
Celler to Rep. Cooley). Critics viewed the two proposals as nullifying the antitrust laws'
application to cooperatives. See 107 CONG. REC. 13,353-54 (1961) (statement of Sen.
Kefauver).
91 S. REP. No. 566, supra note 90, at 2320. Supporters argued that the large
number of farmers keep commodity prices low. Compare 107 CONG. Rac. 13,345 (1961)
(statement of Sen. Long) (explaining that farmers, under the control of the Secretary,
must act collectively to support prices) with note 13 supra and accompanying text
(discussing the rationale behind antitrust protection for bargaining associations-bar-
gaining strength).
107 CONG. REC. 13,340 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kefauver). Kefauver concep-
tualized the Capper-Volstead Act as allowing farmers to act collectively but did not
believe the Act was intended to encompass joint actions by or agreements between
cooperatives. E.g., id. (hypothetical illustrating this conceptualization). Legislative his-
tory on this issue, however, is not as clear as Kefauver believed. See note 65 supra and
accompanying text.
,01 107 CONG. REc. 13,342 (1961) (statement of Sen. Long). See also 107 CONG.
REc. 13,344-45 (1961) (statements of Sen. Proxmire). This argument was inconsistent
with the amendment's purpose of overruling the Milk Producers Ass'n decision. See
note 93 supra and accompanying text. Kefauver argued that the Department of Justice
had no jurisdiction under § 401(b) to proceed against cooperatives engaging in predatory
practices. See 107 CONG. REc. 13,345 (1961). See also 107 CONG. Rac. 13,348 (1961)
(statements of Sens. Holland and Kefauver) (legislative history concerning the Depart-
ment of Justice enforcement limited to Congressional Record references since the De-
partment of Justice representative made his statements at closed hearings); 107 CONG.
REc. 13,352 (1961) (statement of Sen. Pastore) (Later courts will be left on their own
to determine the effect of amendment).
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cooperatives to monopolize.' 0' The proponents also argued that
since "friendly" regulators examine the antitrust aspects of other
industries-for example banks and railroads-the Department of
Agriculture should be allowed to decide antitrust issues of co-
operatives. 0 2 Additionally, if a monopolistic agricultural coop-
erative were to grow too large, Congress could legislate to remedy
that situation.
10 3
The amendment authorizing mergers under the regulatory
control of the Department of Agriculture failed.'°4 In ad-
dition, although the cooperative joint action amendment
passed the Senate, 0 5 the Conference Committee deleted the
proposal because it felt the amendment was unnecessary
since the Capper-Volstead Act authorized joint action.'06 A
year later, the Supreme Court confirmed the Committee's
Congress, in the Capper-Volstead Act, recognized it was conveying power
to those associations to monopolize prices in an area, if they could. If they
did, and a price got out of line, the Secretary of Agriculture had the power
to protect the public and bring the price down to where it ought to be.
107 CONG. REc. 13,342-43 (1961) (statement of Sen. Long). See also 107 CONG. REC.
13,345 (1961) (statement of Sen. Aiken) (willing to allow cooperatives monopolization)
(1961) (statement of Sen. Long) ("Some day I hope we may find that the farmers will
work together to such an extent that it will be necessary for the Secretary of Agriculture
to move in to tell them they are getting too much."). The power to monopolize was
apparently based on the 1930 Attorney General's opinion. See 107 CONG. REc. 13,350-
51 (1961) (statements of Sens. Holland and Long). For criticism of this opinion see note
40 supra. When Senator Long asked Senator Kefauver to provide an example where a
cooperative merger had driven competitors out of the market, Kefauver responded:
"Then why legislate? If it will never happen-and I grant it may never have happened
in the past-I do not see any necessity for section 401(b)." 107 CoNG. Rac. 13,343
(1961).
102 See, e.g., 107 CONG. REc. 13,561-62 (1961) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). But
see note 93 supra (discussing the distinction between e regulated industry where all firms
are regulated and agriculture where only cooperatives would be regulated).
101 107 CONG. REc. 13,346 (1961) (statement of Sen. Holland) (providing example
of past remedial legislation concerning the Sunkist Growers). But see 107 CONG. REc.
13,346 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kefauver) (questioning the fairness and timeliness of
this mechanism).
" 107 CONG. REc. 13,564 (1961). A later attempt to pass a revised version of the
amendment also failed. See 107 CONG. REC. 13,584 amendment table (d) (1961).
101 107 CONG,. REc. 13,364 (1961). See also 107 CONG. REc. 13,557 (1961) (Subse-
quent attempt to amend this proposal failed.).
'0 The committee of conference hereby reaffirms ... the national policy of
aiding and encouraging the organization, operation, and sound growth of
farmer cooperatives to the end that the farmers of the Nation may through
group action conduct their business operations effectively to obtain a fair share
10531984-1985]
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Neither proposed amendment became law; nevertheless, the
debates demonstrated general congressional approval of the co-
operative movement. 08 Although not citing these congressional
debates, subsequent court decisions reflect the general philoso-
phy of approval of cooperative actions.
III. DECISIONS SINCE 1961
There have been a number of decisions analyzing the Capper-
Volstead Act's exemption since 1961. Before analyzing this case
history, however, it is necessary to determine the types of be-
havior which constitute "predatory practices." ' Predatory con-
duct has been
defined as conduct which has the purpose and effect of ad-
vancing the actor's competitive position, not by improving the
actor's market performance, but by threatening to injure or
injuring actual or potential competitors, so as to drive or keep
them out of the market, or force them to compete less effec-
tively." 0
of the Nation's income.
The committee of conference construes existing provisions of law to
mean that two or more cooperative associations, as defined in the Agri-
cultural Marketing Act of 1929, as amended, may act jointly in a federation
of such cooperative associations, or through agencies in common, in per-
forming those acts which farmers acting together in one such association
may lawfully perform.
CONF. REP. No. 839, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2243, 2332.
I'l See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. at
29 (holding that three cooperatives were in practical effect one association so that in
their interorganizational dealings they were immune from the antitrust laws).
,u See notes 88-103 supra and accompanying text.
Maryland & Virginia Milk Prod. Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 467
(1960). See generally Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 608, 631
n.31 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (discussing lay, scholarly and judicial definitions of this phrase),
aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1327 (1984).
110 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 43, at 108 (1977) (defi-
nition in a general business context, not an agricultural cooperative context). See also
Capper-Volstead Act, supra note 9, at 445-46. There should be a liberal interpretation
of the Capper-Volstead Act by reference "(1) to the common legitimate business practices
of regular business corporations today and (2) to the fundamental and realistic principles
necessary for a business also to be a cooperative organization." Id. The reason for this
type of interpretation is that the Capper-Volstead Act was passed to allow cooperatives
to function in a business-like manner. See id.
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This definition is consistent with the use of the phrase in Milk
Producers Association, where the Court stated a cooperative
must not "achieve monopoly by preying on independent pro-
ducers.""
There are two characteristics of predatory conduct. First,
there is something odd or unnatural about the behavior-con-
duct that is not normal business conduct. This characteristic
requires investigation into the mores of the market place to
determine whether one can describe the conduct as fair or nor-
mal."'2 Second, predatory conduct has an identifiable target, a
class of competitors. This characteristic is inherent in predatory
conduct since it causes only competitors to have greater losses
(or less profits) than they can afford."
3
Although definitions are useful, they only make sense in the
context of real world situations." '4 In Gulf Coast Shrimpers and
Oystermans Association v. United States,"' 5 decided before Milk
Producers Association, the court denied the immunity provided
in the Fisherman's Collective Marketing Act '16 to a fisherman's
cooperative. ' 7 The court denied immunity because the coopera-
tive excluded all people from the market who did not buy or
sell in accordance with its fixed prices. This coerced membership
constituted a predatory practice.
' 8
In Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers's Cooperative
Association,"19 a competitor lost money because of the cooper-
, 362 U.S. at 467. The association had argued that its activities had a business
purpose and not primarily an anticompetitive purpose. This is the same distinction the
Sullivan definition makes between an improvement in competitive position due to market
performance and one due to threats or force against a competitor. L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 110, § 43, at 111-12. But see 512 F. Supp. at 631 n.31 ("There is a trend towards
stretching the word predatory so as to let it include less pejorative conduct; for instance,
conduct may be classified predatory if it evidences an intent unnecessarily, unreasonably,
or illegally, to exclude a competitor from a market.").
,,2 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 110, § 43, at 111-12.
M See id. at 112.
1" In a noncooperative situation, the Tenth Circuit recognized the necessity of
context in order to understand the term, predatory. "The term probably does not have
a well-defined meaning in the context it was used, but it certainly bears a sinister
connotation." Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927
(10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
"' 236 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956).
15 U.S.C. § 521 (1982).
See 236 F.2d at 665.
" See id.
"1 388 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1967) (permanent injunction granted, preventing future
picketing and boycotts), affg, 261 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
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ative's pickets' 20 during an attempt to stop the plaintiff's area
sales and monopolize the area. The cooperative wanted to sever
the plaintiff's retail connections because the plaintiff would not
concede to the defendant's demands.' 2' The court found that the
defendant intended to destroy its major competitor and take
over the area 22 and held the boycott alone was sufficient to
deny Capper-Volstead immunity to the cooperative.'23
In certain circumstances, boycotts and pickets are tortious
threats or attacks upon persons or property and are obviously
predatory. Less obvious are those acts involving pricing, adver-
tising, or purchasing policy since there is no "bright-line" in
these areas between normal competitive efforts and predatory
practice aimed at excluding competitors from the market.'24 An
example of this subtleness is found in Knuth v. Erie-Crawford
Dairy Cooperative Association. 25 The plaintiffs, as a class, were
120 Id. at 797 (losses amount to $3,600 per week). Although the cooperative picketed
against innocent third parties (the area grocers), their purpose was to create pressure on
the grocers to stop purchases of the plaintiff's processed milk. The pickets were suc-
cessful. See id. at 793, 797.
Since picketing was useful in the bargaining process and public policy favored
cooperative marketing, one writer predicted that peaceful use of pickets, for the purpose
of recognition or building pressure during negotiations, should be allowed. See Antitrust
and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 521-22. One court agreed:
The "embattled farmers" . . . are therefore simply making a success-
ful "adjustment" to the surroundings of their modern cultural milieu when
they dramatize their claims by demonstrations. Their standing is not infe-
rior to that of either protesting groups merely because they did not hire
Mike Quill or Martin Luther King to serve as impressario of their show.
Isaly Dairy Co. v. United Dairy Farmers, 250 F. Supp. 99, 102 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
12, 388 F.2d at 797. Complete monopolization was not necessary, since there was a
tendency toward monopolization or a reasonable likelihood of substantial lessening of
competition. This justified injunctive relief. See 261 F. Supp. at 385 (citing United States
v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964)).
M' See 388 F.2d at 797. There is a distinction between the two United Dairy Farmers
cases. In the first case, the court characterized the suit as an effort to conduct collective
bargaining in the guise of an antitrust suit. The second suit involved the combination
of the United Dairy Farmers and another cooperative to engage in the boycott and
picket in order to persuade retailers to buy the defendant's milk. This explains the
divergence in language concerning boycotts and pickets. See id. at 796-97.
' Id. at 798. See also North Texas Producers Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348
F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir. 1965) (cooperative promoting boycotts by grocers and consumers
of the plaintiff's product), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966).
121 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 110, § 43, at 112-13.
- 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968). Although this case does not directly examine the
scope of the Capper-Volstead Act, it does examine price discrimination as a predatory
practice. See id. at 423-24.
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Pennsylvania members of the defendant-cooperative. 26 The co-
operative also received milk from out-of-state farmers. The co-
operative sold the out-of-state milk to processors at a lower price,
since Pennsylvania milk had a floor price set by the state, while
foreign milk did not. 27 In the complaint, the Pennsylvania farm-
ers alleged the cooperative's practice of giving rebates to pro-
cessors who used Pennsylvania milk constituted discriminatory
price fixing by the cooperative and the processors, as the farmers
believed they would get full price for their milk. 128 The appellate
court recognized discriminatory pricing as a predatory act and
reversed the dismissal of the complaint. 29 The case is subtle
because, at first blush, it appears that this practice helped the
plaintiff-class by promoting Pennsylvania milk sales. With the
rebates, the processors had an incentive to purchase the Penn-
sylvania milk. 30 The complaint alleged there had been discrimi-
natory pricing, coupled with the harm to the plaintiffs, who as
cooperative members should have received the rebate money.
This allegation was sufficient to state a claim.' 3' The net effect
of the predatory practice is unclear since the appellate court was
only reviewing the propriety of the complaint's dismissal.
3 2
An example of a poorly reasoned case is North Texas Pro-
ducers Association v. Metzger Dairies.33 In this case, the court
merely cited the definition of "predatory conduct,' ' 3 4 stated the
facts, 35 and concluded "that the jury could reasonably find from
the evidence that the Association engaged in monopolistic prac-
tices or attempts to monopolize proscribed by section 2 of the
I-" Id. at 422.
12 See id.
"'- See id. at 423-24.
J2 See id. at 423, 424. See also Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635
F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Knuth as support for the proposition that
discriminatory pricing can be monopoly power used in a predatory fashion), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 818 (1981).
' See 395 F.2d at 422-24.
See id. at 424.
"- See id. at 422-23. The court applied a very lax standard to determine the
sufficiency of the complaint. See id. at 423.
348 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966).
See id. at 192, 193-94.
"' In this case, the cooperative supplied 85-90% of the raw milk marketed in the
Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas area. It also controlled nearly all of the milk transportation
in the region. See id. at 194-96.
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Sherman Act."'13 6 Unlike most recent cases, the court in Metzger
Dairies did not thoroughly analyze the facts. 37 The cooperative-
defendant was a marketing cooperative which owned and oper-
ated a surplus milk processing plant and owned or leased hauling
trucks.'3 The plaintiff accused the cooperative of maintaining
milk prices at a constant level even though the federal minimum
price had fallen.' 39 Independently, this should not be considered
a predatory trade practice; 40 however, the methods the cooper-
ative used to enforce this price clearly amounted to predatory
acts.' 4' The Association stopped selling milk to the plaintiff-
dairy,142 attempted to stop the dairy's alternative source of sup-
ply, attempted to purchase the dairy and organized a grocer
boycott of the dairy's products. These acts constitute sufficient
predatory conduct to deny Capper-Volstead immunity from the
cooperative-monopoly. 43 The court should have relied on this
type of factual analysis rather than its blunt but correct state-
ment of the law.
Other issues concerning the scope of antitrust immunity in-
clude whether a cooperative may only market the product,
whether a cooperative may completely monopolize an area, and
136 Id. at 196.
' See notes 202-301 infra and accompanying text.
It is important to note that a cooperative's ownership of such facilities should
not, by itself, strip the cooperative of its exemption. The Capper-Volstead Act protects
cooperatives which collectively handle, process or market the products of their members.
The Capper-Volstead Act not only permits such ownership, but actually encourages it.
See Comment, supra note 7, at 98.
There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether cooperatives should be allowed
to own handling, processing and marketing facilities and remain exempt from the
antitrust laws. Size of the cooperative is not determinative. The nature of the coopera-
tive's activities is determinative, i.e., is the cooperative operating for the benefit of its
producer members? See id. at 102. There may be some additional requirements: I) the
products handled must be the same as those grown, and 2) at least 51%o of the amount
handled must be grown by the members. See Florida Citrus Mutual, 53 F.T.C. 973, 975
(cooperative denied immunity because it operated for the benefit of grower-members,
handlers, and processors, not just grower-members), aff'd, 53 F.T.C. 999 (1957).
348 F.2d at 194.
,4 See, e.g., Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 715 F.2d 30, 31-32 (2d
Cir. 1983) (Maintaining higher pricing is not a predatory practice unless it damages or
destroys competition.).
"' Enforcement was necessary because the plaintiff-dairy refused to capitulate to
the cooperative. The dairy used its own high-cost trucks to haul milk. 348 F.2d at 195.
,41 The refusal to deal would be a sufficient act to preclude Clayton or Capper-
Volstead protection. See Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 521.
"I See 348 F.2d at 196.
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whether a cooperative may fix prices. The court, in Treasure
Valley Potato Bargaining Association v. Ore-Ida Foods,144 said
that a cooperative which only bargained with a purchaser, may
receive Capper-Volstead immunity. 45 The court relied on the
statutory language allowing cooperatives to have common mar-
keting agents. 46 If the Act authorizes a separate common mar-
keting agent, then clearly two associations may jointly market
and contract to achieve their legitimate goals. 47 The processor-
plaintiff argued, however, that the cooperative should be denied
Capper-Volstead Act immunity since it did none of the Act's
listed functions. 148 The court rejected this argument, saying an
association, whose principal function was to bargain the price
and contract conditions, was engaged in "marketing." 149 "[Bar-
gaining] necessarily requires supplying market information and
performing other acts that are part of the aggregate of functions
involved in the transferring of title to the potatoes."' 150 The court
believed that bargaining cooperatives, therefore, needed a more
liberal construction of the Capper-Volstead Act than handling
cooperatives. '5'
Closely related to the bargaining cooperative issue is whether
the Capper-Volstead Act immunizes an intracooperative conspir-
acy. In Schoenberg Farms v. Denver Milk Producers,5 2 the
complaint alleged an intracooperative conspiracy. Since section
1 of the Sherman Act prohibits those conspiracies in restraint
of trade between separate business entities, the court found the
-- 497 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1974).
'" See id. at 215.
', See id. at 214-15. "Such associations may have marketing agencies in common;
and such associations and their members may make the necessary contracts and agree-
ments to effect such purposes." 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982).
14, See id. at 214. See also Sunkist Growers v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods.
Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962) (concluding that separate organization does not preclude
the growers from being considered as one organization for the purposes of the exemp-
tions). The Ore-Ida court also relied on the Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926, 7
U.S.C. § 455 (1982). See 497 F.2d at 214.
" 497 F.2d at 214. The court rephrased the issue: "[M]ust associations engage in
the sale of potatoes in order to be considered as engaged in 'marketing?' " Id. at 215.
See id. at 215.
" Id. These are characteristics of the definition of marketing. See id. (quoting
WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1953) (marketing)).
See id. at 215-16 (quoting The Capper-Volstead Act, supra note 9, at 450-51).
231 F. Supp. 266 (D. Colo. 1964).
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complaint to be fatally defective. 53 Although the court based its
decision on sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,'54 the reasoning
was consistent with Sunkist Growers v. Winckler & Smith Citrus
Products Co.' 55 and Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Associ-
ation language about looking at the substance of the organiza-
tion, not the form. Courts apply the antitrust laws only when
the cooperative's conspiracy is with a nonexempt person.
56
Another related issue is the legality of an intercooperative
merger, involving the merger of two independent cooperatives
as well as intercooperative agreements. The Milk Producers As-
sociation decision is not apposite since it involved the acquisition
of a noncooperative by a cooperative. 57 The Winckler & Smith
Citrus Products Co. opinion also is not determinative since that
Court viewed the agreements as only intracooperative agree-
ments.158 A district court has held that the Capper-Volstead Act
exempts intercooperative agreements;' 59 however, this may not
apply to price fixing agreements.'16 The district court's reasoning
is nonetheless sound for intercooperative mergers.' 6' In addition,
See id. at 269-70.
See id. at 270.
370 U.S. 19.
'6 [N]othing ... suggests that a corporate officer can be regarded as a
conspirator with his fellow officers and his own corporation in violation
of the conspiracy provision of Section 2 when he merely acts as an officer
to establish the policy and advance the interests of the corporation-and
this is so even when the policy of the corporation is to monopolize.
231 F. Supp. at 270.
See Comment, supra note 7, at 93.
' 370 U.S. at 29.
, United States v. Maryland Coop. Milk Prod., Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C.
1956). The court reasoned that since the Capper-Volstead Act allowed cooperatives to
have common marketing agents, it must have been contemplated that cooperatives could
jointly fix prices. See id. at 154. Additionally, since the members of the two cooperatives
could have formed one large cooperative, holding an intercooperative agreement illegal
would place form over substance. See id.
,60 See Mahaffie, supra note 9, at 440-41. The Supreme Court in Winckler & Smith
Citrus Prods. Co. did not use the Maryland Coop. Milk Prod., Inc. court's reasoning
or cite the case. Rather, the Court emphasized the lack of economic significance in the
existence of three separate entities. See id. Congress did not intend to exempt pricing
agreements. The fact that cooperatives could become one cooperative is irrelevant
because, in fact, they are separate. That separateness is meaningful because the Court
emphasized that Sunkist's use of three entities had no economic significance and that
outsiders were not deceived. See id. at 441.
16 Id. at 441. Separateness between cooperatives is not so important in mergers as
in price agreements. See id. Maryland Coop. was cited by the Supreme Court in Milk
Producers Ass'n. See 362 U.S. at 472 (dictum). See also Comment, supra note 7, at 93
(discussing whether the citation means that intercooperative activity is a per se violation
of the antitrust laws or whether the "legitimate object" test will be applied on a case-
by-case basis).
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recent cases, at least philosophically, support immunity for in-
tercooperative mergers.'
62
There is little case law concerning cooperative production
restrictions. What law there is demonstrates judicial reluctance
to allow a cooperative to have this authority.' 63 Despite this
reluctance, there are good reasons to allow immunity for pro-
duction restrictions.' 64 Production limitation as a predatory act
depends upon the specific fact pattern: 65 Is it not a normal
activity with the product?; is the entity against whom the act is
directed, a competitor of the cooperative? The better way to
view production limitations is as an enforcement mechanism sup-
porting a price increase to the purchaser of the cooperative's
products. '66
,62 See notes 192-253 infra and accompanying text.
'1- See Antitrust Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 515 (citing California
Bean Growers' Ass'n v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co., 248 P. 658 (Cal. 1926));
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Jones, 117 S.E. 174 (N.C. 1923); Stark County Milk
Prod. Ass'n v. Tabeling, 194 N.E. 16 (Ohio 1934); List v. Burley Tobacco Growers'
Co-op. Ass'n, 151 N.E. 471 (Ohio 1926); Washington Cranberry Growers Ass'n v.
Moore, 201 P. 773 (Wash. 1921), aff'd on reh'g, 204 P. 811 (Wash. 1922)); Note, supra
note 9, at 536 n.57. The Department of Justice also believes that agreements among
cooperative members to limit production would be illegal. Comment, supra note 7, at
101. The thesis of the argument against cooperative production restrictions is that only
the government has power to control production. When Congress provided for produc-
tion restrictions in the Agricultural Marketing Act, it also provided that such action
would not violate the antitrust laws. Id. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 shows
the legislative intent that production limits be accomplished through regulation and not
by groups of farmers. Mahaffie, supra note 9, at 439.
- The following reasons have been postulated: 1) Cooperatives must have control
over supply in order to have control over price; 2) The Capper-Volstead Act's language
would not be tortured if "preparing for market" included production; 3) If one considers
a cooperative and its members as one economic entity, that entity should be able to
regulate production as do other enterprises; 4) The public interest is protected by the §
2 remedy against undue enhancement of prices. See Antitrust and Agricultural Cooper-
atives, supra note 9, at 515-16. See also Comment, supra note 7, at 101. If cooperatives
do not have the right to control production, then courts are in the position of being
agricultural planners, even though a court cannot force production in other sectors of
the economy. Cooperatives would find methods by which to evade the law. Id.
"- Comment, supra note 7, at 101.
' Production limits and their resulting high prices, however, will probably be
ineffective in the long-run, given the economic characteristics of farming.
Some economists have maintained that this might permit a possibility of
abuse and permit a monopoly. But a farmer's monopoly is impossible. If
the cooperative marketing association makes its price too high, the result
is inevitable self-destruction by over production in the following years. No
other industry except agriculture has this automatic safeguard.
61 CONG. REc. 2058 (1922) (statement of Sen. Capper).
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Likewise, there is little case law about exclusive dealing con-
tracts between cooperatives and their members. Generally, the
contracts run for a limited time and the members have a rea-
sonable time to terminate their agreements. These contracts should
not be held to violate the antitrust laws. 67 However, if this form
of contract is used as a weapon, i.e., preventing entry into the
market, then a court should consider this to be a predatory
practice.
IV. POLICY REFLECTION DURING THE 1970s
During the late 1970s, a noticeable shift in attitudes towards
agricultural cooperatives occurred-cooperatives were no longer
perceived as requiring the entire protection of the Capper-Vol-
stead Act.168 The economic realities of the 1920s, which justified
the Capper-Volstead immunity then, did not exist in the 1970s. 16
9
Cooperatives had obtained large market power through merger
and federation. 170 Although economic theory postulated that a
monopoly could not occur in the agricultural industry, 7 market
defects have precluded a competitive industry. 72 Additionally,
since the 1920s, changes in the agricultural commodity marketing
system decreased the need for marketing cooperative activities. 73
For these reasons, at least one commentator has concluded that
Congress should narrow the scope of the Capper-Volstead Act.
74
The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures also recommended the Act's scope be construed
narrowly. 7 5 The Commission recommended that "mergers, mar-
keting agencies in common, and similar agreements among co-
167 See notes 110-1 13 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 169-201 infra and accompanying text.
169 See Note, supra note 4, at 344-52, 360-67.
70 See id. at 344-46.
See id. at 347-49.
£7- See id. at 349-52.
" See id. at 360-67. The changes since 1920 include better market information
dissemination; coordination of farming activity from planting to harvesting; use of
commodity futures to control price swings; and increased governmental control of
agricultural production. See id.
174 See id. at 388.
"I See 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCE-
DURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 253-71 (1979) [Herein-
after cited as NATIONAL CoMMnISSION REPORT].
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operatives should be allowed only if no substantial lessening of
competition results.' 7 6 Additionally, the Commission urged that
the "undue price enhancement" language of section 2 of the
Capper-Volstead Act be more precisely defined. ' 77 The Commis-
sion also concluded that section 2 enforcement should be sepa-
rated from the promotional duties of the Department of
Agriculture.'
7 8
The Commission based the proposals on its concern that the
potential for cooperative monopoly had become a substantial
threat to the marketplace. 79 Concentration in agricultural mar-
keting had been increasing, particularly in the dairy, fruit and
staple crop industries. 80 In addition, cooperatives had been able
to circumvent traditional market restraints on their power. 8' The
fact that cooperative monopolies might not be as effective as
industrial monopolies did not convince the Commission that
cooperative monopolies were any more desirable.
18 2
Given this economic situation, the Commission believed the
appropriate action was prevention and regulation. 83 The Com-
mission felt prevention of the development of monopoly power
could be achieved by subjecting cooperative mergers to Clayton
Act analysis. 84 Since the economic effect of federated coopera-
tives and common marketing agencies currently authorized by
the Capper-Volstead Act is the same as a merger, to avoid
circumvention of the Clayton Act, they should be subject to the
same competitive scrutiny as a merger.' 85
"6 Id. at 253.
" Id.
M' See id. It is interesting to note that this recommendation is the exact opposite
of the 1961 Senate merger amendment which would have placed exclusive regulatory
jurisdiction in the Department of Agriculture. See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying
text. The Commission also suggested the Secretary of Agriculture consider competitive
factors in the agricultural marketing order and agreement system. See NATIONAL COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 171, at 253. Further discussion of this regulatory system is
beyond the scope of this Note.
171 See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 171, at 258-29.
" See id. at 259.
"" See id.
,x See id.
See id. at 260.
See id. at 261. Clayton Act scrutiny would maximize competition without undue
hardship upon cooperatives. Cf. id.
'1- Id. at 262.
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Regulation through more effective use of section 2 of the
Capper-Volstead Act would also ensure no abuse of the monop-
oly power generated by internal cooperative growth.'8 6 Regula-
tion of this form of monopoly power is superior to prevention
since prevention of such power may impair the ability of a
cooperative to achieve its legitimate goals.8 7 By precisely defin-
ing the scope of section 2 and separating the Department of
Agriculture's enforcement function from its promotional func-
tion, effective regulation of self-generated monopoly power could
occur. 1
88
Agricultural economists were also generally critical of the
cooperative system.8 9 One economist suggested that cooperatives
should restrict their economic power'9 and operate within the
marketing order system.' 9' This was especially true given the
public reaction to the dairy cooperatives' involvement in the
Watergate affair.'9 2 There was also strong criticism of the co-
operatives' business experiments' 93 and market power. 9 4 Another
19 See id.
18, See id. Prevention would be difficult to administer. Also, the risk of creation
of monopoly power through internal growth is lower. Id.
See id. at 263.
See generally AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Marion
ed. 1977) (symposium of agricultural economists) [hereinafter cited as AGRICULTURAL
COOPERATIVES].
'* See Breimyer, The Capper-Volstead Act: A Historical and Philosophical Assess-
ment, in AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES, supra note 189, at 8.
,91 See id. This economist, however, warned against conceptual preoccupation with
cooperatives since their difficulties are merely symbolic of the entire economy's diffi-
culties. See id. at 8-9.
,91 "During the 1970s, agricultural cooperatives have been besieged by an unprec-
edented series of criticisms. Implicated in the political influence peddling scandal of the
Watergate era, the large dairy cooperatives also soon found themselves defendants in
several antitrust cases brought by the Justice Department." Marion, Editor's Introduc-
tion to AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES, supra note 189, at i.
191 "Cooperatives were also experimenting with a variety of business arrangements
with their producer members and their customers. Several joint ventures were tried such
as Heublein-United Vintner and Minute Maid-Florida Orange Marketeers. These met
with mixed results and strong criticisms from some quarters." Id.
' The market power of cooperatives and their ability to unduly enhance
price was examined in a report developed by the Federal Trade Commission
and in hearings conducted by the house Judiciary Committee. Other gov-
ernment or academic investigations attempted to evaluate the influence of
instruments of trade and coordination-such as marketing orders and full
supply contracts-when these were used by marketing cooperatives.
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economist noted that changes in the farm sector of the economy
may make immunity inappropriate.'95 Additionally, the change
in the cooperative's capital structure now makes it more like an
agribusiness than a cooperative. 96 Other economists expressed
concern about the effectiveness of bargaining cooperatives in
influencing commodity prices.' 97 Another demonstrated that the
antitrust laws should not distinguish between open and closed
membership cooperatives. 98 Despite this general criticism, two
economists did conclude that the present legal structure was the
appropriate policy approach to agricultural cooperatives.191
V. LITIGATION SINCE THE REFLECTION
Despite the uncertain need for cooperative antitrust immu-
nity, the courts have continued to construe the Capper-Volstead
Act liberally. This was consistent with earlier precedent and the
Senate's understanding of the Act in 1961 .200 Two courts, how-
ever, did interpret the Act restrictively, although neither cited
specific policy reasons for doing this.
2 0 '
One of the more frequent recent issues is whether a coop-
erative may maintain a monopoly when that monopoly is not
achieved through predatory acts. The watershed case in this area
is Fairdale Farms v. Yankee Milk [Fairdale 1],202 in which the
court recognized the "inherent conflict" between section 2 of
the Sherman Act, making it unlawful for a person to monopo-
lize, and the Capper-Volstead Act, authorizing the collective
' Cf. Raup, Cooperatives, Capper- Volstead and the Organization and Control of
Agriculture, in AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES, supra note 189, at 12-14.
' Id. at 14-17.
'9' See Garoyan & Thor, Observations on the Impact of Agricultural Bargaining
Cooperatives, in AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES, supra note 189, at 145.
'1 See Youde, Cooperative Membership Policies and Market Power, in AGRICUL-
rURAL COOPERATIVES, supra note 189, at 224.
'" Masson & Eisenstat, Capper-Volstead and Milk Cooperative Market Power:
Some Theoretical Issues, in AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVIES, supra note 189, at 67.
210 See notes 88-105 supra and accompanying text.
'0, See notes 269-98 infra and accompanying text.
112 635 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981). Fairdale Farms'
complaint alleged violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982), since Yankee
Milk and the Regional Milk Marketing Agency, Inc. had conspired to fix the price of
raw milk and had monopolized and attempted to monopolize the raw milk trade in the
area where Fairdale procured its milk. Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 715
F.2d 30, 31 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 711 (1984).
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actions of farmers. 20 3 The very phrasing of the Capper-Volstead
Act leaves no doubt that farmers may combine into cooperative
monopolies of any size without judicial interference. 204 The issue
before the court was whether the Capper-Volstead Act protected
Yankee Milk and six other cooperatives which organized the
Regional Cooperative Marketing Agency, Inc.
205
The court upheld the right to organize in this manner (as-
suming no predatory conduct) for several historical reasons.
First, the Sherman Act originally was to have a section which
exempted cooperatives from its provisions; 20 6 however, Congress,
without explanation, omitted this section from the Act. 20 7 Sec-
ond, the legislative history of the Capper-Volstead Act showed
that Congress recognized that a cooperative whose membership
constituted as much as ninety-three percent of the growers of a
particular commodity would be legal under the Capper-Volstead
Act. 20 Third, congressmen believed that farmers needed this
1°1 See 635 F.2d at 1040. This conflict has long been recognized. See also Note,
supra note 9, at 531 & n.32 ("The status of agricultural cooperatives, in relation to the
federal antitrust laws, is . . . unique.").
1 See 635 F.2d at 1040. The court noted that the Secretary of Agriculture had the
authority to issue cease and desist orders if the cooperative monopolizes and restrains
trade to the extent that a commodity's price is "unduly enhanced." Id. One court had
stated that a single cooperative may acquire 100% of the relevant market. See Cape
Cod Food Prods. v. Nat'l Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900, 907 (D. Mass. 1954).
However, there is a natural restraint against such a giant cooperative. Farmers and
ranchers are traditionally independent and believe in local control of their affairs. They
are hesitant to delegate authority to make marketing decisions, especially to a distant
authority. See Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 512.
"I See 635 F.2d at 1038. The Agency's function was to establish prices for the
individual members' milk. Id. at 1039.
See id. at 1041.
10 See id. Contra LEGAL PHAsEs, supra note 6, at 277 (the amendment was de-
feated); Note, supra note 9, at 526 (amendment defeated because it was felt that farmers
inherently could not monopolize their industry). The proposed amendment stated: "Pro-
vided, That this act shall not be construed to apply to ... any arrangements, agreements,
or combinations among persons engaged in horticulture or agriculture made with the
view of enhancing the price of agricultural or horticultural products." 21 CONG. REC.
2611 (1890), quoted in Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 399 n.13. Since the
amendment applied only to § 1 of the Sherman Act and made no attempt to exempt
cooperatives from the antimonopoly provisions of the Sherman Act, "it was contem-
plated even at this early date that although cooperatives would be free to form, they
would not be at liberty to monopolize." Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 399
n.13.
20. See 635 F.2d at 1041. Contra Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 407-10 &
nn.65-81. This conflict in legislative history is due to the simple fact that the legislative
history is conflicting. See notes 59, 65 supra.
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help, especially after the agricultural depression of 1920, and
President Harding also supported efforts to help cooperatives.
20 9
Fourth, later legislation demonstrated congressional willingness
to strengthen cooperative associations. 210
The court also looked to the Supreme Court and the Federal
Trade Commission for guidance.21' The Supreme Court had
apparently approved a district judge's jury charge that a coop-
erative may legally have a monopoly of its relevant product.
212
Noting that if any organization would be opposed to a monop-
olistic cooperative it would be the Federal Trade Commission,
the court quoted Commission language stating that, if it used
no predatory practices, a cooperative may legally attain 100
percent of a market. 21a The court itself also emphasized the legal
restraint upon obtaining the monopoly-the prohibition against
using predatory trade practices. 214 For these reasons, the appel-
late court held that the district court's reliance" upon United
N See 635 F.2d at 1041-43.
10 See id. at 1042-43. This court did not place much emphasis on the subsequent
legislation despite its one page description of it. "It is apparent from these statutes that
agricultural cooperatives were 'a favorite child of Congressional policy.' " Id. at 1043
(quoting 5 TourmtN, ANTrTusT LAWS § 6.1, at 334 (1950)).
See id. at 1044.
Id. at 1044 & n.6 (quoting Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. winckler & Smith Citrus
Prods. Co., 284 F.2d 1, 19 (9th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 19 (1962)).
The court also quoted Supreme Court language indicating that farmers may act together
under the Capper-Volstead Act which otherwise would be illegal under the antitrust
laws. See id. at 1044 (quoting Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458, 465 (1960); National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436
U.S. 816, 842 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)). But see Recent Developments, supra note
1, at 410-12.
2I See 635 F.2d at 1044 (quoting Food Price Investigation: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 715 (1973) (Bureau of Competition's response to ques-
tions)). See also 119 F. Supp. at 907 (Jury charge stated that a cooperative may acquire
100% of the market, "if it does it solely through these steps which involve cooperative
purchasing and cooperative selling," but prohibited "predatory practice[s] ... or ...
the bad faith use of ... legitimate devices.").
I", See 635 F.2d at 1044. See also Comment, supra note 7, at 100 (If the cooperative
used illegal acts, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice would
have jurisdiction to prosecute, and the Secretary of Agriculture could protect the con-
sumer.).
2I Relying on the Grinnell decision, the district court stated, "a plaintiff claiming
[that] an agricultural cooperative has violated section 2 [of the Sherman Act] has no
greater burden than if he sued a corporation." Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk,
Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,029, at 77,117 (D. Vt. Nov. 2, 1979), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 635 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
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States v. GrinnelP'6 was erroneous. 217 There are instances where
a cooperative may willfully acquire or maintain monopoly power.
The court also said the maintenance of monopoly power which
is not the result of a superior product, business acumen or
historic accident is a characteristic of a growing, powerful co-
operative. 21 8 Additionally, the court held that the Grinnell deci-
sion does not apply to monopoly power from the "formation,
growth and combination of agricultural cooperatives. ' 21 9 Unless
Fairdale Farms could show predatory conduct by Yankee Milk
on remand, then the case was to be dismissed.
220
Following remand, the Second Circuit faced the same case
three years later in Fairdale Farms v. Yankee Milk [Fairdale
H]221. The court held that there had been no predatory practices
by the cooperative. 222 The plaintiff alleged the defendant com-
mitted a predatory act by raising its price higher than the min-
imum price set by the federal government. 223 The court was
2.6 384 U.S. 563 (1966). The Grinnell Court stated:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements:
(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.
Id. at 570-71.
217 See 635 F.2d at 1040, 1044-45. The Second Circuit has been criticized for
ignoring various pronouncements that cooperatives, once formed, are to be treated as
corporations. See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 397-98, 406-12 (criticizing the
case for ignoring the legislative history and judicial treatment of the Capper-Volstead
Act).
218 See 635 F.2d at 1045. See also Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 405 n.61
(discussing the nature of the two theories behind a charge of monopolization, the power
theory and the abuse theory).
239 635 F.2d at 1045. Of course, this power may not be acquired through predatory
means. Id.
21 Id. The case was remanded since it was not clear whether the district court
denied the defendants' summary judgment motion on the ground that predatory acts
had been shown or on the ground that Fairdale Farms, the plaintiff, would have to
meet the Grinnell monopolization test. See id.
"I See Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 715 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 711 (1984). The first Fairdale Farms case will hereinafter be cited as
Fairdale I; the second Fairdale Farms case will be cited as Fairdale II.
2 See id. at 34.
22 See id. at 31-32. The Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorized
the government to set minimum prices. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5) (1982). The raison d'etre
for bargaining cooperatives is to raise the price of farm products. See Antitrust and
Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 513.
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reluctant to examine cooperative pricing policies,224 but did rec-
ognize the need to examine "competition-stifling practices.' '225
The court stated that merely raising prices does not constitute a
predatory practice.226 In fact it has quite the opposite effect
since, by raising the price of milk, the cooperative would en-
courage lower-priced producers to enter the market. 227 The plain-
tiff also argued that the price increase was a predatory practice
against the consumer; however, the court disagreed saying the
practice must be aimed at identifiable individuals, a group of
competitors or potential competitors.228 Initially, this analysis
seems in conflict with the Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop.
Association229 analysis. In Knuth, the predatory act was aimed
at the Pennsylvania cooperative members and not at the coop-
erative's competitors. 230 The cases can be harmonized, however,
since the cooperative members are potential competitors of the
cooperative.
The requirement that the predatory act be something other
than an act-which has the effect of increasing the price to the
consumer is also consistent with the goal of the Capper-Volstead
Act. This Act establishes farmer bargaining leverage over the
purchasers of farm produce, 231 and thereby likely increases the
product's consumer price. If these increases were "predatory,"
then the bargaining leverage the Capper-Volstead Act was to
make legitimate would be a predatory practice. Therefore, the
analysis in Fairdale II is quite consistent with this goal of the
Capper-Volstead Act.
Another interesting issue frequently facing courts is whether
refusal to supply commodities to a buyer under a contract con-
See 715 F.2d at 32.
See id. (quoting Milk Producers Ass'n, 362 U.S. at 463). See also United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 204-05 (1939) (agreement with non-exempted parties to
fix prices is illegal).
2 See 715 F.2d at 32.
22" See id. at 32-33. "It would be self-defeating for a cooperative to raise its prices
when its share of the market is so small as to leave it without bargaining power." Id.
at 33.
I' Id. at 32 (citing United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192, 194 (6th Cir.
1981); 635 F.2d at 1044 (Fairdale 1) and quoting L. SULLrvAN, supra note 110, at 112)).
29 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968).
2"0 See notes 125-31 supra and accompanying text.
21 See notes 5, 6, 9, 13 & 15 supra.
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stitutes a predatory practice. 2 2 In Fairdale I, the cooperative
threatened to stop delivering milk because of a price dispute
involving one county of cooperative milk producers.23 3 The court
refused to declare this act to be a predatory practice for several
reasons. First, the cooperative supplied only forty percent of the
dairy's milk requirement. Second, an inexpensive alternative
source of supply existed nearby. Third, the termination of the
contract necessarily created an added market for the defendant's
competitors. 234 Based on these facts, the court determined that
this behavior was not an unlawful use of lawfully acquired
monopoly power:
Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not give purchasers the
exclusive right to dictate the terms upon which they will deal.
Yankee, which did not have a monopoly covering both the
New York and New England areas, lawfully might refuse to
sell to a purchaser which would not meet its terms of sale and
which had other sources of supply available.23 1
The court, in Kinnett Dairies v. Dairymen, Inc.,2' 36 gave a
broader holding on this issue. A cooperative may refuse to deal
with a customer if the cooperative does not have a monopoly in
the product. 2 7 If a cooperative does have a monopoly, then it
must not "engage in a refusal to deal upon reasonable terms
.... "238 Even if the cooperative were a monopoly, it may refuse
to sell2a9 if the purchaser does not meet the fair, reasonable and
"I See generally Antitrust and Agricultural Cooperatives, supra note 9, at 521
(providing a discussion of various fact patterns and the antitrust liability associated with
each pattern's refusal to deal).
"1 715 F.2d at 33.
See id. at 33-34.
21 Id. at 34.
216 512 F. Supp. 608 (M.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 715 F.2d 520 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 1327 (1984).
13 See id. at 632.
238 Id.
211 An illegal refusal to deal would be one used to maintain the monopoly. See id.
Accord 635 F.2d at 1044 (Fairdale 1) (refusal to deal listed as a predatory practice if the
cooperative has attained a monopoly; whereas, it would be harmless if attempted by a
small farm cooperative) (quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (citations omitted)). See also
Comment, supra note 7, at 91 ("A refusal to deal for any anticompetitive reason would
probably be held to be outside the legitimate objectives of a cooperative.").
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lawful conditions of the sales contract.24° A cooperative's refusal
to deal may be described as a boycott; however, such a label
does not necessarily make the practice predatory. Rather, a
refusal to sell at a lower price is a legitimate means of fulfilling
the goal of the Capper-Volstead Act.24' It is interesting to note
that, before a refusal to deal is considered to be a predatory
practice, there must be a finding that the cooperative is monop-
olistic. Proof of refusal to deal, therefore, does not independ-
ently give rise to antitrust liability.
242
The monopolization problem presented in Fairdale I was
even more extreme in L. & L. Howell, Inc. v. Cincinnati Co-
operative Milk Sales Association.243 In this case, the plaintiff
hauled milk for the cooperative-defendants. Eighty to eighty-
five percent of the farmers in the hauling area were members of
one of the cooperatives. In 1972, the cooperatives decided to
make a common arrangement to transport milk to a new cus-
tomer. This increased the cost of hauling to the plaintiff. The
defendants did allow a modest price increase by the hauler, but
the plaintiff still could not profit from this business. 244 Although
the case is more important for its discussion of predatory prac-
tices, there is strong language concerning monopolization as a
legitimate goal.24- The court indicated that monopolization by
14 See 512 F. Supp. at 632. See also Comment, supra note 7, at 91 ("[I]f the
refusal to deal is accompanied by any motive to restrain trade, the Court will require
commercial motive, business pattern, and 'reasonable' conduct to uphold the practice.
As a general rule the cooperative should have a strong and valid reason when it refuses
to deal."). But see id. ("Even a simple refusal to deal may not be tolerated when an
examination of the market context is made, even though the refusal has some justifi-
cation.").
2I See GVF Cannery, Inc. v. California Tomato Growers Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 711,
716 n.1 (N.D: Cal. 1981) (citing Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida
Foods, 497 F.2d 203, 215 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974)).
242 See generally Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(refusal to deal as a mechanism to enforce territorial limitation plan).
"1 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,595, at 68,966 (6th Cir. July 20, 1983). The case
was not recommended for full-text publication. "Sixth Circuit Rule 24 limits citation to
specific situations. Please see Rule 24 before citing in a proceeding in a court in the
Sixth Circuit. If cited, a copy must be served on the other parties and the Court." Id.
Despite the prohibition against publication, the case merits discussion.
I" See id. at 68,967-68.
2'5 "This near monopoly status is precisely what the Capper-Volstead Act makes
lawful, and it would not be unlawful even if defendant controlled 100% of the farmers."
Id. at 68,969.
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itself cannot be considered a predatory trade practice. 246 The
plaintiff was coerced into accepting the arrangement because the
cooperative had eighty to eighty-five percent of the farmers in
the area as members. 247 Given the lawful nature of these coop-
eratives, however, this coercion is lawful. 248
In L. & L. Howell, the conduct under examination was the
cooperatives' refusal to pay more for the plaintiff's hauling
services. 249 In finding the defendant's actions lawful, the court
focused its attention upon the objective of the allegedly preda-
tory acts.250 There was no evidence that the cooperatives wanted
to eliminate competition among haulers. The cooperative did not
haul milk and there was no evidence of an intent to do so in
the future .25  The court described this act as a benefit to the
cooperative's members rather than a predatory practice against
a competitor. 252 Additionally, there was no evidence that the
cooperative desired to extend its monopoly powers through the
low price paid to the milk haulers. 253
A similar issue involving milk haulers is the scope of the
Capper-Volstead Act exemption to those who "handle" agricul-
tural products .254 In Green v. Associated Milk Processors,255 the
court held that "handle" includes the hauling of milk,25 6 saying
it is a central function of a milk cooperative to ensure that the
transportation of milk occurs properly.2 7 The plaintiff argued
N6 See id.
247 See id.
1, See id. This analysis is weakened since there are other reasons that the cooper-
ative's practices were not predatory. See notes 249-53 infra and accompanying text.
11 See 1983-2 Trade Cas. 65,595, at 68,968. The cooperatives' monopolization
of the hauling area was not considered predatory since the monopolization was to
achieve legitimate goals of the cooperative. See id. at 68,969.
2 See id. at 68,969.
-' See id.
2 See id. Supporting this proposition, the court noted that the cooperative was
legally able to contract with a different hauler. Also, the plaintiff was under no com-
pulsion to accept an unfavorable contract. See id. at 68,969-70.
25 See id. at 68,969.
2." Section 1 of Capper-Volstead exempts those persons engaged in the processing
and "handling" of agricultural products from the reach of the Sherman Act. 7 U.S.C.
§ 291 (1982).
" 692 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1982).
216 See id. at 1157.
25 Id. This is due to the inherent nature of the product. It must be moved quickly
and under controlled conditions to the processor in order to ensure its freshness and
purity. Id. See also 512 F. Supp. at 624-25 (providing a brief description of milk's
characteristics during hauling).
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that hauling was no longer within the scope of this cooperative's
legitimate activity, since the cooperative had contracted for haul-
ing as an agent of the members and not as a cooperative. 258 The
court described this argument as "a distinction without a differ-
ence [since] a co-op is simply a collection of member-farmers. "259
This analysis is reasonable since it places substance over form.
This analysis could also be described as an application of the
Milk Producers Association intent analysis, which looked into
specific acts to determine whether an intent to monopolize ex-
isted. 260 The Green court merely looked into the contract to
determine whether the cooperative signed as a cooperative or as
an agent.
In Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen County Cooperative Beet
Growers,26' the court declared the normal operations of a co-
operative were not predatory practices. 262 The cooperative, with
230 member-producers, rejected the last offer of the local beet
purchaser by nearly a two-to-one vote. The members, by a three-
to-one vote, then decided not to release any member from an
agreement that precluded the members from making individual
contracts with the purchaser. 263 Although the lower court found
that the cooperative threatened rebel-members with suit if they
contracted with the plaintiff,264 the appellate court held that the
plaintiff neither alleged nor proved any predatory conduct such
as picketing, harrassment, coerced membership or discriminatory
pricing.265 There is no explanation why threats of legal action
were not considered predatory acts. 266 Therefore, the better way
to view this case is that it is a "refusal to deal" case, with the
cooperative enforcing the refusal by threats of suit. In order for
refusal to deal to be actionable, the refusal by a monopoly must
be unjustified.2 67 Here, there was no evidence of monopolization
2" Since the cooperative signed the hauler's contracts as the agent of the individual,
the individual remained free to choose who ultimately did the work. 692 F.2d at 1157.
1'9 Id. The court noted that the contract was phrased the way it was in order to
avoid tort liability by the cooperatives for the acts of the haulers.
"I See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text.
'61 725 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 569.
See id. at 566.
See id. at 567.
See id. at 569.
- See id.
" See notes 232-42 supra and accompanying text.
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or the lack of justification. 268 When the case is viewed in this
context, the court's holding is more reasonable.
In United States v. Dairymen, Inc. 269 the Sixth Circuit broad-
ened the predatory practice exception to the antitrust immunity
standard when dealing with charges involving attempts to mo-
nopolize and not actual monopolization. 270 The court recognized
that the term "predatory practices" distinguishes between co-
operatives gaining market power through anticompetitive prac-
tices and those gaining market power through growth.271 Since
the charge was an attempt to monopolize, the plaintiff was not
required to show the cooperative's conduct rose to the level of
predatory practices, 272 as the elements of an attempt to monop-
olize charge are different from a monopolization charge. The
attempt charge requires that the defendant engage in "anticom-
petitive conduct with a specific intent to monopolize.' '273 Intent
is particularly important when there is economic justification for
the act because even if the act has economic justification, "its
use may be undertaken with unlawful intent and in the desire to
achieve an unlawful goal.' '274
The lower court, however, did not address the issue of
whether defendant's acts were made with the specific intent to
monopolize. 275 Therefore, on remand, the appellate court in-
structed the lower court to determine whether there were less
exclusionary means by which the defendant could achieve its
goals. More importantly, the lower court was instructed to de-
26 See 725 F.2d at 566-69. "IN]either the complaint nor the record establish any
violation by the association of the antitrust laws of the United States." Id. at 569.
29 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981).
170 See id. at 193.
27 See id. at 194. The court quoted the Milk Producers Ass'n decision. "[Tihe
Capper-Volstead Act 'did not leave cooperatives free to engage in practices against other
persons in order to monopolize trade, or restrain and suppress competition with the
cooperative.' " Id. (quoting 362 U.S. at 467).
272 See id. The court also defined predatory practices as "anticompetitive practices
without any business justifications." Id. Immediately before this definition, the court
used the term, "i.e.," which may indicate that this definition is not exclusive. See id.
27I Id. The offense of an attempt to monopolize also requires that there be "a
dangerous probability that the attempt would be successful." Id. (citations omitted). For
a discussion of the elements of a monopolization action, see note 216 supra.
27, 660 F.2d at 194. See also notes 75-84 supra and accompanying text.
27I See 660 F.2d at 195. The acts in question were the defendant's use of full-
supply, committed-supply, and exclusive-hauling contracts. Id.
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termine whether "these contracts were intended to stifle com-
petition or were intended to meet legitimate business purposes.
' 27 6
In determining whether the cooperative had the specific in-
tent to monopolize, the district court incorporated all the defend-
ant's actions, creating a whole "picture of defendant's dealings
and allegedly anticompetitive practices. ' 27 7 While the behavior
was not as culpable as picketing, harassment, boycotts, or dis-
criminatory pricing, it was sufficient to evidence specific intent
to monopolize.
The acts that gave rise to the finding of specific intent were:
(1) The cooperative had resorted to anticompetitive pooling
practices in Mississippi; (2) The cooperative used illegal hauling
contracts in Indiana and Tennessee; (3) There were brush fire
incidents; (4) The cooperative insisted on committed or full-
supply contracts; (5) The cooperative threatened supply cutoffs
to the processors; and (6) Cooperative officials stated that they
had been able to stop a rival's attempt to sell at competitive
prices .278
This examination of conduct to determine intent was advanced
initially by the Milk Producers Association Court when it ex-
amined the totality of evidence concerning the acquisition of
that cooperative's competitor. 279 The court in Dairymen ulti-
mately held that, although the government proved the specific
intent to monopolize the market, it failed to prove that there
was a dangerous probability of success in the attempt to mo-
nopolize.
28 0
27 Id.
Z United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,651, at 69,335
(citations omitted), aff'd, Nos. 84-5003,84-5039, slip op. (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1985). See
note 234 supra.
r See id. But cf. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 577
(10th Cir. 1961) (In determining whether an intent by the government to transcend the
antitrust laws existed, the court said that it would "not lightly infer an intention to do
so."), cert. dismissed sub nom., Wade v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 371 U.S. 801
(1962). See 1983-2 Trade Cas. 65,651, at 69,335. The findings of fact in this case were
determined by the judge. See id. at 69,332. It should be noted that in a conspiracy-
antitrust case, where intent and motive are important, summary judgment should rarely
be given. Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass'n v. Tillamook County Creamery Ass'n, 358
F.2d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S.
464 (1962)). A court, in deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a
claim for which relief could be granted, should be extremely liberal in construing the
complaint. See Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d at 423.
' See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text.
'- 1983-2 Trade Cas. 65,651, at 69,335-36.
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The Eighth Circuit, in Alexander v. National Farmers Or-
ganization,23 ' echoed the Dairymen opinion's analysis of the
importance of intent to achieve an unlawful goal. 2 The court
emphasized that a cooperative's antitrust immunity is extin-
guished whenever it commits predatory acts. 213 The court also
stated the immunity is extinguished when the cooperative uses
lawful behavior to achieve an unlawful goal 2 4 thus creating a
new category of condemned activity, the "anticompetitive" act.13
The intent to monopolize is lawful and protected under the
immunity if pursued through growth only; 216 however, such in-
tent becomes unlawful when its aim is "to pursue monopoly
power by eliminating or restraining competition with the co-op
through predatory or anti-competitive practices."8 7 This latter
form of intent is the essential element which must be proved
under the Dairymen/Alexander analysis of the claim of at-
tempted monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize.
Alexander involved a suit and counterclaim between coop-
eratives. The court held that National Farmers Organization
[NFO] price fixing28s activities were immune2 9 from antitrust
2, See 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982).
232 See id. at 1183.
211 See id. at 1182.
"I See id. at 1182-83. "Moreover, in reviewing an otherwise lawful dairy acquisition
as part of an alleged attempt to eliminate competition, the same Court held that 'even
lawful contracts and business activities may help to make up a pattern of conduct
unlawful under the Sherman Act.' " Id. (quoting Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 472 (1960)). See also notes 75-84 supra and
accompanying text (reviewing four different fact patterns leading to violations of the
Sherman Act).
- See 687 F.2d at 1183.
A cooperative may not use its position, no matter how lawfully acquired,
"to stifle or smother competition." . . . Where such an unlawful intent is
clear, overt acts in furtherance of this purpose are not immunized simply
because they might have other justifications or because they are merely
"anticompetitive" rather than "predatory."
Id. (quoting 362 U.S. at 463).
M$ See id.
27 Id.
1 The trial court had held that the National Farmers Organization's [NFO] acts
did not constitute price fixing. In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litigation, 510 F.
Supp. 381, 422 (W.D. Mo. 1981). The appellate court disagreed. See 687 F.2d at 1184.
8 "The Supreme Court has construed the exemption as permitting 'farmer-pro-
ducers to . . . fix prices at which their cooperative will sell their produce ... without
thereby violating the antitrust laws.' " 687 F.2d at 1184 (quoting 362 U.S. at 466).
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liability due to the Capper-Volstead Act. 290 Other NFO activities
did not violate the antitrust laws since they could not be char-
acterized as anticompetitive practices. 29' The NFO's claims against
the other cooperatives 292 were based on theories of monopoliza-
tion, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopo-
lize. 293 The court dismissed the monopolization and attempted
monopolization claims since the NFO could not show a relevant
market where the rival cooperatives had achieved monopoly
power or a "dangerous probability" of that power.294
The appellate court, however, accepted the conspiracy to
monopolize claim, 29 stating the critical issue was whether the
NFO had shown an intent by the defendants "to pursue [mo-
nopoly] power or seek to eliminate competition through preda-
tory, anticompetitive or other unlawful tactics.' '296 In determining
whether this intent existed, the appellate court held it was erro-
neous for the trial court to view the defendants' acts as "iso-
lated, self-contained actions. ' 297 Rather, it is "the actual conduct
viewed as a whole-which establishes the unlawful conspir-
acy." 298
'1 See id. At issue was whether the NFO qualified as a Capper-Volstead coopera-
tive. The court held that the organizational splintering of the NFO did not preclude
Capper-Volstead status. See id. at 1184-85. Additionally, the decision in National Broiler
Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978), did not create a strict prohibition
against nonfarmer cooperative members where, as with NFO, food processors were not
members of the cooperative. See id. at 1185-87.
"I See 687 F.2d at 1187-88. NFO did solicit members from rival cooperatives but
the court appears to have characterized this as normal business operations. See id. at
1187. To condemn this practice would be to use the antitrust laws as a barrier to market
entry. See id. at 1188. NFO's boycott was within the scope of the Capper-Volstead Act
since the boycott was not directed toward eliminating competition. See id. An attempted
monopolization claim failed because there was no showing that the NFO had a "dan-
gerous probability" of successful monopoly. See id. Other conspiracy claims against the
NFO failed factually. See id. at 1188-91.
9 The other cooperatives were Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., Associated Milk
Producers, Inc., Central Milk Producers Cooperative and Associated Reserve Standby
Pool Cooperative. See id. at 1189.
See id. at 1191.
See id. This dismissal was affirmed since the NFO could not show a relevant
market. See id. at 1191-92.
I'l See id. at 1192-1208. There was a sufficient showing of a relevant market. See
id. at 1193.
Id. at 1193.
See id.
Id. at 1194.
AMPI, Mid-Am and CMPC did conspire to monopolize and eliminate
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CONCLUSION
The United States v. Dairymen299 and the Alexander v. Na-
tional Farmers Organization300 decisions represent a departure
for the courts from the traditional predatory acts analysis in
determining the scope of the Capper-Volstead Act. Neither case
cited specific policy reasons for this departure; nonetheless, by
denying immunity for lawful acts in pursuit of an unlawful goal,
each implicitly recognized the changes in the structure and pur-
pose of agricultural cooperatives. In addition, while the court in
Fairdale I did not consider the changing agricultural economy,
that court did recognize that Congress may want to reconsider
the policy underlying the Capper-Volstead Act.3 10
Both to clarify the scope of the Acts and to address the
current agricultural economy, Congress should reconsider the
policy embodied in section 6 of the Clayton Act and in the
Capper-Volstead Act. As evidenced by the courts' reliance upon
legislative history, the statutes' words provide little help in their
interpretation. That history, however, has created only uncer-
tainty about the scope of the statutes. Uncertainty also remains
as to whether the Sherman Act even applies to agricultural
cooperatives since that issue has never been decided by the
Supreme Court. It was merely the fear of its application which
prompted Congress to provide the statutory immunities.
competition in the marketing of Grade A milk produced in the Midwest,
through the use of discriminatory pricing, coercive supply disruptions and
threats of similar conduct, as well as bad faith harassment and threats of
litigation against independent buyers of NFO milk.
Id. at 1193. See also id. at 1195-1207 (details of the defendants' actions in this con-
spiracy).
2" 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1981).
mO 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982).
301 See Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1045 n.7 (2d Cir.
1980) (Fairdale 1), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
There are those who contend that the economics of farming have changed
so drastically in recent years through farm growth and mechanization that
the Capper-Volstead Act is no longer needed to equalize bargaining
power .... It is for Congress, not the courts, to determine whether there
is sufficient merit in this argument to warrant a redesign of the statute.
Id. (citing Note, supra note 4, at 381-89). Cf. Arizona v. Maficopa County Medical
Society, 457 U.S. 332, 354-55 (1982) (suggesting that policy arguments concerning
application of a per se rule should be directed to Congress, not the Court, since
"Congress may consider the exception that we are not free to read into the statute").
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More important than the legal questions surrounding the
scope of these immunities is the effect of the change in agricul-
ture since the enactment of the Capper-Volstead Act sixty-three
years ago. Whether the change is a sufficient rationale to modify
agricultural antitrust policies is beyond the scope of this Note
and is best left to experts and Congress. What is certain, how-
ever, is that enough change has occurred to prompt some courts
to narrow the scope of the immunity, and others to appear
uncomfortable about applying a 1920s immunity to 1980s eco-
nomic reality.
Congress needs to provide guidance for the courts in this
complex area of the law. Courts either need assurance that the
Capper-Volstead Act (and its case history) embodies current
congressional intent or that a modified statute represents good
policy for the future. Congressional action would ensure reliance
upon the congressional will rather than upon conflicting statu-
tory purposes, conflicting legislative intent and conflicting op-
tions.
Stephen D. Hawke
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